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PROVOKING CHANGE: COMPARATIVE
INSIGHTS ON FEMINIST HOMICIDE
LAW REFORM
CAROLYN B. RAMSEY*
The provocation defense, which mitigates murder to manslaughter for
killings perpetrated in the heat of passion, is one of the most controversial
doctrines in the criminal law because of its perceived gender bias; yet most
American scholars and lawmakers have not recommended that it be
abolished. This Article analyzes trendsetting feminist homicide law
reforms, including the abolition of the provocation defense in three
Australian jurisdictions, places these reforms in historical context, and
assesses their applicability to the United States. It ultimately advocates
reintroducing the concept of justified emotion, grounded in modern equality
principles and social values, as a requirement for voluntary manslaughter
mitigation.
Two insights guide this Article’s critique of partial excuses for murder.
First, the revised legal history of intimate-partner homicide presented here
demonstrates that the modern version of the provocation defense protects a
broader class of angry, jealous, predominantly male defendants than the
traditional doctrine of the nineteenth century did. Heat-of-passion claims
have become the new “abuse excuse” for men. Second, battered woman
syndrome evidence, which is now commonly admitted when abused women
stand trial for murder, resonates uncomfortably with insanity claims.
Reliance on such evidence ignores the fact that “rational moral actor”
theories were also raised successfully in the past to defend domestic
*
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violence victims who killed their partners. Based on these insights, I argue
that the most desirable aspects of the Australian reforms emphasize moral
judgment about the defendant’s reasons for killing and disfavor concessions
to irrationality.
Inspired by Australian efforts, legislatures in the U.S. should
implement comprehensive reform of homicide law and sentencing. Yet,
even if American states retain rigid sentencing structures, this Article
advocates the repeal of the extreme mental or emotional disturbance
defense and a reconceptualization of the provocation doctrine, guided by
substantive equality principles, to require that the defendant’s valuation
was justified. Provocation mitigation should be curtailed by categorical
exclusions for killings arising from beliefs and passions, including lethal
rage at infidelity or the termination of an intimate relationship, that do not
comport with evolving social norms. Furthermore, although many battered
women charged with murdering a violent spouse can successfully claim
provocation under the excuse-based modern doctrine, reformist legislatures
ought to provide a new intermediate outcome that fits better with the
circumstances of such women’s cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
Compared to rape doctrine, American homicide law has changed little
in response to feminist concerns about the gender bias of the criminal law,
aside from the controversial introduction of battered woman syndrome
(BWS) evidence in murder trials. Among nations whose law derives from
the English model, the United States led the pack in allowing expert
testimony on BWS. Yet three states in Australia—a country that embraced
BWS defense strategies comparatively late1—have taken the boldest strides
toward a feminist transformation of homicide law. Victoria, Tasmania, and
Western Australia recently made a move that most American scholars and
lawmakers have been reluctant to advocate: they abolished the provocation
doctrine as a partial defense to murder. Tasmania took this step in 2003
without making other changes to the law of homicide or the admissibility of
1

See PATRICIA WEISER EASTEAL, KILLING THE BELOVED: HOMICIDE BETWEEN ADULT
SEXUAL INTIMATES 141-43 (1993) [hereinafter KILLING THE BELOVED]; Julie Stubbs & Julia
Tolmie, Falling Short of the Challenge? A Comparative Assessment of the Australian Use of
Expert Evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 709, 720 (1999)
[hereinafter Falling Short] (stating that Australian courts have only accepted BWS evidence
since 1991); see also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the
Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 28 (1991) (noting that, in the United States, forensic
psychologist Lenore Walker “had introduced expert testimony on battered woman syndrome
in sixty-five cases in which battered women had killed or hurt their abusers” by 1986). For
more discussion of the BWS theory, including a brief definition, see infra notes 128-32, 210,
233-37, 326-27 and accompanying text.
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evidence,2 whereas Victoria conducted a detailed study of homicide
defenses and then enacted comprehensive reforms in 2005.3 Western
Australia followed suit in 2008, abolishing provocation manslaughter and
establishing a new partial defense for unreasonable self-protective killings
similar to that adopted in Victoria.4 The changes in all three Australian
states embodied a substantive equality position designed to remediate
gender imbalances in the impact of the criminal law. But especially in
Victoria, reformers cited an additional theoretical basis—a moral objection
to the modern provocation doctrine’s failure to distinguish legitimate
emotions and beliefs from wrongful ones.5 The reformers thus reasserted
the relevance of justification, but they were inconsistent about curtailing
psychological excuses that reduce culpability in the guilt phase.
This Article applauds the three Australian jurisdictions for striving to
achieve substantive gender equality in homicide law. However, to some
extent, their approaches embody a pragmatic view of feminist reform that
can be characterized as doing whatever works for women in the short term
and faulted for failing to articulate a coherent normative theory of criminal
responsibility. This Article contends that the criminal law should express
consistent moral judgments about the reasons the perpetrator committed
homicide, not allow male defendants to excuse their equality-denying
violence by claiming to have lost self-control, nor make reliance on
psychological theories the primary method of defending women. Inspired
by the best aspects of the Australian reforms, American states should move
away from partial excuses6 for murder that enforce pernicious gender-based
2

Criminal Code Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003, (Tas.
Acts No. 15/2003).
3
Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6 (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005). For the comprehensive
recommendations of the Victorian Law Reform Commission, see VICT. LAW REFORM
COMM’N, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE FINAL REPORT (2004) [hereinafter VLRC, DEFENCES TO
HOMICIDE],
available
at
http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/
Law+Reform/Home/Completed+Projects/Defences+to+Homicide/; see also infra notes 179237 and accompanying text (discussing the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s proposals).
4
Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act, 2008, § 12 (W. Austl. Num. Acts No.
29/2008). In November 2009, the United Kingdom abolished the provocation doctrine in
favor of a revamped partial defense for “loss of control” that requires either fear of serious
violence or a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c.
25, Part 2, Ch. 1, §§ 54-56. For a brief discussion of the British reforms, which the British
Parliament enacted too late to receive comprehensive analysis in this Article, see infra notes
92, 308-12 and accompanying text.
5
See infra notes 180-82, 187-91, 194-200 and accompanying text.
6
Excuse defenses embody the view that, although the defendant perpetrated a wrongful
act, he should not be blamed or punished because a mental defect or other failing makes him
less culpable. Insanity exemplifies a classic excuse defense that leads to acquittal. The
modern provocation doctrine, which mitigates murder to manslaughter, is often considered
to be a partial excuse. See infra notes 89-116 and accompanying text. On the other hand, an
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stereotypes and that fail to hold men or women to a high standard of
responsibility. In place of the current excuse-based regime of mitigation,
legislatures ought to reintroduce the concept of justified emotion, grounded
not only in contemporary social norms but also in equality principles. This
Article uses history, as well as legal analysis, to assess the Australian
homicide law reforms with a focus on those in Victoria. It also advocates
changes in the United States, including the abolition of the extreme mental
or emotional disturbance (EMED) defense7 and the restriction and
reconceptualization of the provocation doctrine, which mitigates murder to
manslaughter when the defendant claims he acted in the heat of passion.
Reformers in Victoria posited a substantive gender equality rationale
for abolishing the provocation defense based on the predominance of men
among perpetrators of intimate-partner homicide and the fact that men and
women kill in very different contexts.8 Substantive equality theories ask
whether facially neutral rules have unequal effects.9 Thus, while defendants
of both sexes can claim provocation, the defense is biased if it
disproportionately benefits men, entrenches sexist stereotypes, or fails to
recognize women’s experiences.
Although female defendants can
actor who commits otherwise criminal conduct that is not wrongful, or that is less wrongful,
because of the circumstances she faced, including the victim’s aggressive behavior, may
receive exculpation or mitigation on a theory of justification. Other legal scholars have
criticized and modified this framework. I owe an intellectual debt to Dan Kahan and Martha
Nussbaum for their convincing discussion of “evaluative” and “mechanistic” approaches to
emotion in the criminal law. According to the evaluative conception, emotions “express
cognitive appraisals [that] can be morally evaluated” for their appropriateness or
inappropriateness. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 273, 278 (1996). In contrast, the mechanistic
conception sees emotions as “things that sweep over us, or sweep us away, or invade us,
often without our consent or control.” Id. at 279. Kahan and Nussbaum seek to dispense
with the familiar dichotomy of “justification” and “excuse,” arguing that it is misleading and
inadequate. See id. at 318. Nevertheless, this Article uses the “justification” and “excuse”
shorthand for both simplicity’s sake and because the materials it quotes and interprets use
these terms. When this Article refers to “justification,” an evaluative approach to the
defendant’s emotion is intended, whereas “excuse” is used to signify the law’s concession to
circumstances in which the defendant’s will has supposedly been overborne.
7
The Model Penal Code (MPC) version of this partial defense, which mitigates murder
to manslaughter, encompasses “extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962) (emphasis added). However, many states that adopted the
MPC’s proposal simply provide mitigation for a defendant who “acts under extreme
emotional disturbance.” See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.20, 125.25 (McKinney 2009).
For consistency’s sake, this Article uses the acronym “EMED,” except when quoted material
abbreviates “extreme emotional disturbance” as “EED.”
8
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 29-30; see also infra notes 185-87 and
accompanying text (further discussing this rationale).
9
See Katharine T. Bartlett, Gender Law, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (1994)
(describing the theory of substantive gender equality).
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successfully claim the provocation defense (indeed, they may be more
successful raising this claim than men are),10 it does not fit the social
situation in which most women kill. Moreover, when men make use of the
doctrine, it often provides mitigation for morally reprehensible acts and
valuations.
A revised history of homicide defenses supports the abolition or at
least the curtailment of the expansive, modern provocation defense by
exposing the substantively unequal and morally erroneous impact of
supposedly progressive changes in the criminal law. Two flawed historical
narratives have impeded effective reforms. The first is the predominantly
conservative story of how time-honored defenses became distorted by
pseudo-scientific “abuse excuses.”11 In the 1990s, James Q. Wilson and
Alan Dershowitz—two American scholars of divergent political
perspectives—agreed that a proliferation of “abuse excuses” threatened the
legitimacy of the criminal law.12 The admissibility of BWS evidence to
10

Despite the predominance of men as offenders in intimate-partner homicide cases,
female defendants may actually be more successful in claiming provocation and other
mitigating doctrines than male defendants, and they also may receive more lenient sentences
than their male counterparts. See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 28 (citing
LAW REFORM COMM’N OF VIC., HOMICIDE REPORT NO. 40, ¶¶ 164, 165, 167-68 (1991)). An
early study cited by the Victorian Law Reform Commission presented data on ten women
and sixty-five men who raised provocation as a defense: “Of the 10 women who raised
provocation, six (60%) were convicted of manslaughter, and three (30%) were acquitted.
None were convicted of murder. In comparison, 13 (20%) of the 65 male accused who
argued provocation were convicted of murder, 42 (65%) of manslaughter), and six (9%)
were acquitted.” Id. at 28 n.88. But cf. id. at 28-29 (citing a more recent study, which found
that very few women raised a provocation defense in Victoria and none were successful).
According to a report on sentencing in Victoria, issued in 2008, women’s sentences for
manslaughter were generally less severe than men’s, and men generally had to serve more of
their sentences before becoming eligible for parole. See FELICITY STEWART & ARIE
FREIBERG, PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING 115-16 (SENT’G ADVISORY COUNCIL 2008)
[hereinafter PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING] (on file with author); see also PATRICIA EASTEAL,
LESS THAN EQUAL: WOMEN AND THE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 33 (2001) [hereinafter
LESS THAN EQUAL] (finding that in New South Wales and Victoria from 1988 to 1990, men
were more likely to be convicted of murder or manslaughter than women and that 75% of the
women received a non-custodial sentence or less than five years, compared to only 22% of
the men). However, these “lenient” sentences may not actually be more lax if we consider
that many women who receive them killed out of fear of a violent aggressor.
11
See generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE ABUSE EXCUSE AND OTHER COP-OUTS, SOB
STORIES, AND EVASIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY (1994) (criticizing this trend from a liberal
perspective); JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN
OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? (1997) (presenting another rendition of this thesis by a conservative
social scientist).
12
Alan M. Dershowitz, Moral Judgment: Does the Abuse Excuse Threaten Our Legal
System?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 775, 779 (2000) (book review) (noting parallels between his
work and that of James Q. Wilson and accusing Wilson of impropriety for borrowing his
ideas without attribution).
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support battered women’s self-defense claims constituted a focal point of
their attack.13 Although this critique contains at least a grain of truth, it errs
in blaming women’s rights advocates for the ills of the modern criminal law
and in embracing tradition for tradition’s sake.
The second narrative—a feminist interpretation polar to the first—
recounts an oppression story in which female victims have either been
killed by brutal men or convicted of murder in a gender-biased criminal
justice system for using violence to defend themselves.14 This latter
narrative draws on historical evidence of women’s subordinated status
under the system of coverture15 and the sexist value system that persisted
long after that legal regime was dismantled. But it nevertheless overlooks
the moral condemnation of violence against women in the past and the role
this norm played in convicting male murder defendants and defending
women who killed abusive partners.16 Indeed, feminists have only
13

DERSHOWITZ, supra note 11, at 11-16; WILSON, supra note 11, at 56-58.
See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 165-66 (1987); CAROLINE A.
FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE REASONABLE WOMAN AS A
MEASURE OF MAN 157-58, 197-98 (2000); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 221 (1993); CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE
REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 22-23 (2003);
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 113-14 (2000);
LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY
RESPONDS 236-37 (1989); Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women
Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 121-23, 139-40 (1985); see also
Susanne Davies, Captives of Their Bodies: Women, Law, and Punishment, 1880s-1980s, in
SEX, POWER, AND JUSTICE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON LAW IN AUSTRALIA (Diane Kirkby
ed., 1995) (stating that late nineteenth-century “Australian feminists condemned the law’s
harsh punishment and inadequate protection of women” and that, even in the late twentieth
century, women’s “acts of self-preservation tend to be misunderstood and condemned as
ruthless and premeditated murder”); Robert M. Ireland, Frenzied and Fallen Females:
Women and Sexual Dishonor in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 3 J. WOMEN’S HIST.
95, 102 (1992) (describing the nineteenth-century feminist view that the unwritten law
embodied a double standard that treated female avengers of sexual dishonor more harshly
than male defendants accused of comparable crimes).
15
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *421, 430 (1765):
14

By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and
consolidated in that of her husband: under whose being protection, and cover, she performs
everything; and is therefore called in our law-french a feme-covert, foemina viro co-operta; is
said to be covertbaron, or under protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and
her condition during her marriage is called her coverture.
16

For evidence that female defendants who killed their partners were often acquitted,
convicted of lesser charges than murder, or given lesser punishments, whereas intimate
homicides perpetrated by men increasingly aroused condemnation in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth-centuries, see infra Parts II.B and II.C. See generally Carolyn B. Ramsey,
Intimate Homicide: Gender and Crime Control, 1880-1920, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 101 (2006)
(making this argument with regard to the American states of New York and Colorado).
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belatedly realized that the modern, excuse-based version of provocation
actually protects a broader class of angry, jealous male defendants than the
traditional doctrine17 and that BWS evidence resonates uncomfortably with
insanity defenses for women.18
The rationale reformers in Victoria offered for their overhaul of
homicide defenses embodied a trenchant reinterpretation of the “abuse
excuse” by suggesting that the provocation doctrine operates in similarly
pernicious ways.19 Whereas Wilson wanted to retain the provocation
defense,20 opponents of this doctrine in Australia convinced three state
parliaments and, to a great extent, the general public that it was genderbiased and primarily operated to excuse male anger, jealousy, and control

17
The most influential study showing the effects of Model Penal Code reform on
intimate homicide cases is Victoria Nourse, Passion’s Progress: Modern Law Reform and
the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1331-34, 1352-67 (1997). Since their
adoption in the second half of the twentieth century, EMED doctrines have protected men
who committed separation murders from the death penalty. See Elizabeth Rapaport, Capital
Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital Domestic Murder in the PostFurman Era, 49 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1521, 1528 (1996).
18
For notable feminist critiques of BWS evidence by American scholars, see generally
Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes,
Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211 (2002); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing
Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); see also Crocker, supra note 14, 137 (opining that BWS
allows the legal system to treat women’s cases under a “separate and unequal standard of
behavior”); Mahoney, supra note 1, at 38-43 (expressing concern that the learned
helplessness component of Lenore Walker’s theory may lead to stereotyping). For similar
Australian perspectives, see LESS THAN EQUAL, supra note 10, at 53-54; Jocelynne A. Scutt,
Self-Defence and Women’s Lives: Reality and Unreality in Criminal Justice, in A JURY OF
WHOSE PEERS? THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF JURIES IN AUSTRALIA 100, 107-16, 119 (Katy
Auty & Sandy Toussaint eds., 2004); Stubbs & Tolmie, Falling Short, supra note 1, at 714,
720-21, 736-38; Julie Stubbs & Julia Tolmie, Battered Woman Syndrome in Australia: A
Challenge to Gender Bias in the Law?, in WOMEN, MALE VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW 192, 199211 (Julie Stubbs ed., 1994) [hereinafter Battered Woman Syndrome in Australia]. Celia
Wells remarks that “it has . . . recently become de rigueur to note the essentializing and
syndromizing effect of the admission of BWS.” Celia Wells, Provocation: The Case for
Abolition, in RETHINKING ENGLISH HOMICIDE LAW 85, 91 (Andrew Ashworth & Barry
Mitchell eds., 2000).
19
Cf. Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of
Judgment in the Criminal Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (1998) (reviewing JAMES Q. WILSON,
MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM?). What is
remarkable and exciting about the Victorian reforms is that their proponents convinced such
a broad base of supporters—including the parliaments, the press, and many ordinary
Australians—of this view.
20
WILSON, supra note 11, at 103. To his credit, Dershowitz noted that the heat-ofpassion defense could be misused and argued that focusing on alleged provocations
diminishes “the moral importance of the other factors that differentiate criminals from lawabiding citizens who are also provoked but do not respond with lawlessness.” DERSHOWITZ,
supra note 11, at 139.
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over women.21 Critics of BWS evidence fault it for pathologizing abused
women and creating a special category for their conduct,22 but Victoria’s
reformers recognized that the modern provocation doctrine plays a similar
role in male defendants’ cases. Urging the abolition of provocation, they
called for a transformed regime of homicide defenses in which intimate
killings would be understood in a social context and judged from a moral
standpoint.23 Victoria’s successful campaign against provocation thus
provides an opportunity to examine legislative changes that attempted,
albeit inconsistently, to eschew excuses in favor of a moral evaluation of
intimate-partner homicide.
Unfortunately, Victoria’s reformers did not go far enough in curbing
the influence of excuses on the criminal law. Despite elevating the
significance of relationship history and social context in terms divorced
from psychology, they failed to jettison BWS evidence. Moreover,
although they wisely created a legal category of defensive homicide, which
serves as a safety net for abuse survivors whom a jury does not want to
acquit,24 they did not make sufficiently clear that this mitigating doctrine
could be conceived as a partial justification based on a moral judgment
about the reasons the defendant killed, rather than as a partial excuse for
irrationality. Finally, they imported duress, still tethered to BWS evidence,
into their homicide statute,25 which further muddied the evaluative
orientation of their reform package.
The weaknesses of Victoria’s revolution in homicide law are as
instructive as its strengths because they demonstrate the ways in which the
feminist re-telling of criminal justice history has obscured the nuanced role
of gender in homicide defenses. Despite producing a thoughtful analysis,
the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC or Commission)—the
statutory body that spearheaded the overhaul—failed to free itself from the
shortcomings of the feminist oppression story. A more balanced reading of
provocation’s evolution yields important insights about the operation of
partial defenses. Although excuse-based doctrines have for centuries
21
See Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6 (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005); Criminal Code
Amendment (Abolition of Defence of Provocation) Act, 2003, (Tas. Acts No. 15/2003);
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 27, 29-30, 34. For a discussion of public
outrage over the successful use of the provocation doctrine to defend jealous men who killed
their female intimate partners, see infra notes 163-65, 306 and accompanying text.
22
See supra note 18 (collecting feminist critiques); see also WILSON, supra note 11, at
56-58 (criticizing BWS evidence from a conservative angle).
23
See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at xxi, xxv.
24
Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6, 9AD.
25
Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, §§ 6, 9AG (Duress) & 9AH (3)(b) & (e) (Family
Violence Evidence) (Vict. Acts); see VLRC, DEFENSES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 121
(advocating admissibility of BWS evidence in context of duress).
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broadcast negative messages about women when used on behalf of abused
female defendants charged with murder,26 reliance on excuses coexisted as
early as the nineteenth century with an alternate defense strategy—the
moral condemnation of violence against women.27 Concern about policing
norms of respectable masculinity also helped secure murder convictions of
violent men.28 Indeed, only in the last fifty years or so has a turn toward
expansive, excuse-based mitigation unmoored from moral judgment
significantly enlarged opportunities for men to escape severe punishment
for separation killings. To be sure, the historical condemnation of intimatepartner homicide perpetrated by men and the corresponding sympathy for
abused women charged with murder arose in part from paternalistic views
of the male duty to protect the so-called weaker sex.29 Gender roles have
changed dramatically in the last century, but this should not blind feminist
reformers to the legal and rhetorical potential of moral judgment in the
modern criminal law. Seeing partial defenses through the lens of
justification allows us to narrow their operation in a way that tracks a
modern appraisal of the values underpinning a defendant’s lethal conduct.
This Article proceeds in three major parts. Part II suggests that, in
criminal justice systems based on English precedents, the provocation
doctrine of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries offered a narrower
safe harbor for violent men than does the modern version. Despite its
paternalism, the traditional approach to intimate-partner homicide generally
condemned male brutality against women and took past abuse into account
in female defendants’ cases. Part II thus contends that, rather than
supporting the retention of the expansive modern provocation doctrine,
historical analysis bolsters the case for its abolition or at least its
curtailment.
Part III first provides background information about intimate-partner
violence and related laws in modern Australia and expresses concern about
feminist approaches that inadvertently expand legal defenses for angry,
violent men while they cast women as psychologically damaged. Part III
then presents a critical analysis of the homicide reforms enacted in Victoria

26
See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 16, at 126-28 (discussing defenses based on women’s
supposed irrationality and weakness in late nineteenth-century New York and Colorado); see
also Coughlin, supra note 18, at 28-42 (comparing BWS to such nineteenth-century excuses
as the marital coercion defense, which presumed a married woman who committed a crime
did so under her husband’s coercion and which was grounded in psychological theories
about women’s feeblemindedness).
27
See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 43-50, 53-72 and accompanying text.
29
See infra notes 40, 73-74 and accompanying text.
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in 2005 and briefly compares them to the abolition of the provocation
defense in Tasmania and Western Australia.
Part IV assesses the applicability of the recent Australian reforms to
the United States. Because American sentencing regimes are now in flux,
some states may be willing to shift consideration of provocation claims to
sentencing, as Victoria has done. However, even if constraints on
discretion in sentencing preclude a line-by-line graft of Victoria’s changes
onto American codes,30 moral evaluation informed by equality principles
should be adopted and the role of excuse doctrines curtailed. Specifically,
in the United States, legislatures ought to repeal EMED statutes based on
the Model Penal Code. If the provocation defense is retained in any form,
its operation should be restricted by categorical exclusions for unjustifiable
beliefs or emotions that led the defendant to kill. American lawmakers can
also learn from other aspects of Victoria’s reform package. For example,
widespread adoption by the states of an imperfect self-defense or “defensive
homicide” provision would offer a desirable outcome between murder
convictions and acquittals if, in contrast to Victoria’s approach, such a
defense were expressly theorized as a partial justification stemming from
the deceased’s violence, rather than as a concession to mental abnormality.

II. THE DOORWAY TO EFFECTIVE CHANGE: REVISING FLAWED LEGAL
HISTORIES OF INTIMATE-PARTNER HOMICIDE
A. WHY LEGAL HISTORY MATTERS

Scholars who defend the provocation doctrine often appeal to the
weight of history in making their arguments. Joshua Dressler contends that
the partial defense has a long heritage that should not be discounted,31 and
Wilson includes it among the time-honored traditional doctrines he wants to
retain.32 Yet neither explains why its age should make it more defensible
against charges of its unfairness to women, who for centuries had no hand
in establishing or maintaining it. Moreover, even historical arguments
against placing the burden of proving heat of passion on defendants
concede that the defense could be abolished completely without violating
the United States Constitution.33
30

See infra notes 272-79 and accompanying text.
Joshua Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult
Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 963 (2002).
32
WILSON, supra note 11, at 103.
33
Patterson v. United States, 432 U.S. 197, 228 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
31
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On the feminist side there is a tendency to reduce the history of murder
defenses to a simple narrative of gender discrimination against female
defendants that is weakened by empirical evidence that women in United
States, Britain, and Australia have been acquitted of murder more often than
their male counterparts.34 Thanks to Jeremy Horder’s influential legal
history of the evolution of provocation from a partial justification for
defense of honor to a partial excuse for loss of self-control,35 scholars and
lawmakers generally realize that the doctrine changed over time.36
Nevertheless, many detractors continue to see the justification- and excusebased versions of provocation as different forms of the same kind of
patriarchy,37 although the latter, more expansive approach is actually much
worse.38
The legal treatment of murder cases in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries embodied two strands. The first strand, which the
scholarly literature has more often recognized than the second, was the
excusing sympathy of courts, juries, and the public for supposedly
damaged, hysterical females.39 If a woman’s irrationality was emphasized
at trial, the jury would often acquit her on grounds of insanity. However, a
second and more remarkable strand existed, too: the moral condemnation of
excessively violent men. Over the course of the nineteenth century, this
strand increasingly led to murder convictions for male defendants and more
lenient treatment of wronged women charged with killing their abusers.
Indeed, it allowed female defendants to contend that they had acted as
34

For female defendants’ greater likelihood of being acquitted or convicted of a lesser
crime than murder, see supra note 10 and infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
35
JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 2, 23-25, 72 (1992).
36
For example, the VLRC cited Horder’s book when it provided historical background
to its recommended reforms. See VLRC, DEFENSES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 21.
37
See, e.g., Wells, supra note 18, at 88 (making such an assumption); “My Twin Sister
Was Cut Off in Her Prime and She Will Probably Be out in Maybe Four . . . Five Years”:
Murder Law Change, HERALD SUN (Austl.), Nov. 19, 2004, at 7 (reporting that Victoria
Attorney General Rob Hulls cited the provocation defense’s origin as an honor-killing
doctrine as proof that it was outdated, but also criticized it for being used as an excuse).
38
See Nourse, supra note 17, at 1332; see also Caroline Forell, Homicide and the
Unreasonable Man, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 597, 609 (2004) (reviewing CYNTHIA LEE,
MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM)
(commenting that the EMED doctrine “is an example of Reva Siegel’s ‘preservation through
transformation,’ only worse” because the modern doctrine “does not just preserve the old
forms of male bias, it expands them”).
39
See Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to
Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 993 (1995) (stating that, historically, “the most
obvious explanation when an otherwise respectable woman responded violently to abuse was
that she was insane”); see also Coughlin, supra note 18, at 28-42 (discussing the ways
paternalistic sympathy for women’s supposed weakness allowed them to escape criminal
responsibility).
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responsible moral agents, and it permitted courts to bar men’s partialdefense theories based on simmering sexual jealousy or other emotions
outside the traditional provocation doctrine’s narrow bounds.
The gendered values underpinning such appraisals have changed
dramatically over time. Extreme violence against women was considered
unmanly in the late nineteenth century,40 whereas today we condemn it as
the sexist denial of women’s equality and autonomy. Nevertheless,
historically, legal outcomes in domestic murder cases came closer than
might be expected to what many modern feminists consider desirable. I do
not mean that men who kill out of a desire to control their female intimates
should receive capital punishment or that a return to paternalistic solicitude
for female weakness should be a feminist goal. I simply mean that, in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were fewer excuses for
lethal violence against women than there are today.
Twentieth-century changes generally did not improve legal approaches
to intimate-partner homicide. As the provocation doctrine was expanded to
incorporate the individual traits and psychological impairments of the
defendant, it became easier to defend jealous, controlling men based on
theories of cumulative (and almost completely irrational) rage.
Furthermore, increased reliance on psychological defense strategies, now
bolstered by BWS evidence, stigmatized the female defendants it was
intended to help without distinguishing appropriately between the various
levels of innocence or guilt these women displayed.
Part II has three modest aims. First, it describes a nineteenth- and
early twentieth- century trend toward convicting male defendants of murder
for killing female intimates. Second, it provides examples of cases from the
same time period in which women successfully raised self-defense claims
or were at least treated sympathetically due to their fear of physical
victimization by the deceased. Finally, Part II explains why the expansion
of the provocation doctrine through more individualized consideration of
the defendant’s circumstances, including his volitional impairment, and the
repudiation of the cooling-time limit made it easier for jealous, angry men
to obtain mitigation.
B. THE LIMITS OF MITIGATION FOR MEN

There have always been gender asymmetries in the identity of
murderers. Across centuries and geographic boundaries, males outnumber

40

See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 124-25.
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females as both perpetrators and victims of homicide.41 In modern
Australia, for example, men commit seven out of eight killings.42 Yet, in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, intolerance of many types of
provocation claims became a mark of civility.43 The fate of many men who
killed their wives or girlfriends was thus transformed from a choice
between verdicts, including manslaughter or acquittal, to a choice between
gradations of punishment for murder.44 Data that legal historians have
culled in the United States, Britain, and Australia suggest this to be true
across the English-speaking world,45 with the possible exception of the
American South.46 Although male dominance over women permeated the
legal history of countries founded in the Anglo tradition, such dominance
was not uncomplicated. It involved the policing of men by other men,
including the punishment of those who transgressed by killing their
spouses. This punishment was understood to be a moral imperative, not
simply a means of preserving male power. Indeed, the denunciation of
male brutality toward women seems to have become widespread due to a
complex confluence of religious ideals, notions of respectability, and the
41
See id. at 142 n.212 (collecting studies that show such a gender imbalance in homicide
offending); see also PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 111 app. 2 (noting that,
in Australia, homicides are overwhelmingly committed by men).
42
Jenny Morgan, Who Kills Whom and Why: Looking Beyond the Legal Categories 7
(Victorian Law Reform Commission Occasional Paper, 2002).
43
See MARTIN J. WIENER, MEN OF BLOOD: VIOLENCE, MANLINESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN VICTORIAN ENGLAND 199-200, 239 (2004); Ramsey, supra note 16, at 141-56; see also
Carolyn Strange, Masculinities, Intimate Femicide, and the Death Penalty in Australia,
1890-1920, 43 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 310, 334 (2003) (“[J]udges’ sentencing statements and
newspaper editorials periodically clarified not only the illegality of lethal violence but the
cultural illegitimacy of claiming jealousy and wounded masculine pride to justify
femicide.”).
44
See WIENER, supra note 43, at 222 (making this observation about British cases);
Ramsey, supra note 16, at 156 (noting that the main difference between the fate of male
intimate-murder defendants in New York and Colorado between 1880 and 1920 was that, in
New York, they tended to be executed, rather than receive life sentences); Strange, supra
note 43, at 318 (stating that complaints about their victims’ behavior “did not save men from
conviction in the[] 64 capital cases [that she studied], but it did save capitally convicted
husbands and lovers from the gallows”). For further discussion of Australian cases, see infra
notes 53-55, 65-67, 71-72 and accompanying text.
45
See infra notes 43-72 and accompanying text.
46
For example, Texas courts “regularly excused homicides committed well outside the
time frame of the adultery—that is to say, in flagrante delicto was no longer a factor for
manslaughter.” JOHN PETTEGREW, BRUTES IN SUITS: MALE SENSIBILITY IN AMERICA, 18901920 299 (2007). However, many of these cases involved men who killed the wife’s
paramour, rather than being intimate-partner homicides. See id. at 298-302 (discussing not
only the heat-of-passion defense, but also a Texas “paramour statute” that treated a man’s
killing of his wife’s lover as justifiable homicide and that courts liberally construed to justify
killings based on circumstantial evidence, rather than actual witnessing of adultery).
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indignation of liberal thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor at
the maltreatment of wives.47
Martin Wiener has identified a trend in England “begun in the
eighteenth century but only coming to fruition in the nineteenth” of seeing
women as “more moral and more vulnerable than hitherto, while men were
being described as being more dangerous, more than ever in need of
external disciplines and, most of all, of self-discipline.”48 Thanks to the
important position of women in the spiritual household, such trends may
have started even earlier in colonial America, where Puritan influence led to
the criminalization of domestic violence in the seventeenth century.49 By
the mid-1800s, “[k]indly treatment of one’s wife . . . became an important
qualification for full citizenship” in both countries.50
Conditions for white women in Australia during the era in which New
South Wales, Tasmania, and Western Australia served as penal colonies
were worse than elsewhere in the English-speaking world. Feminist scholar
Anne Summers asserts that “[f]rom 1788 until the 1840s almost all women
[in Australia] were categorized as whores,” and historians concur that the
sexual commodification of female convicts constituted a prevalent aspect of
social relations in the penal colonies.51 The “damned whore” taint also
extended to some non-convict, immigrant women who arrived in Victoria,
South Australia, and other parts of the continent.52 However, even in
colonial Australia, men were prosecuted, convicted, and punished for
47

See WIENER, supra note 43, at 151-62 (describing such influences in nineteenthcentury England); Ramsey, supra note 16, at 124-25, 148-49 (discussing Victorian ideals of
respectable manhood, including that of the Christian Achiever in the United States).
48
WIENER, supra note 43, at 3 (emphasis in original).
49
See ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST
FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 4 (1987). But cf. MARY BETH
NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS & FATHERS: GENDERED POWER AND THE FORMING OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY 78 (1996) (contending that spousal abuse prosecutions in colonial
America “did not necessarily stem from the belief that a husband was wrong to use force
against his wife, although that was what the Massachusetts statute stated. Rather, the state
and the community stepped in to mediate marital disputes when one or both parties seemed
to have lost sight of their appropriate roles—when wives failed to submit to their husbands’
rule, when husbands ceased to govern wisely”).
50
WIENER, supra note 43, at 161; see Ramsey, supra note 16, at 124-25 (discussing
nineteenth-century ideals of manliness in the United States); cf. Strange, supra note 43, at
311 (noting that judges’ sentencing statements, internal legal memoranda, and news articles
“periodically expressed masculine disapproval of husbands’ misused marital authority” in
New South Wales).
51
ANNE SUMMERS, DAMNED WHORES AND GOD’S POLICE 267, 313-16 (1994); see also
JUDITH A. ALLEN, SEX & SECRETS: CRIMES INVOLVING AUSTRALIAN WOMEN SINCE 1880 4-5
(1990); PAULA J. BYRNE, CRIMINAL LAW AND COLONIAL SUBJECT: NEW SOUTH WALES 18101830 39, 50, 287 (1993).
52
SUMMERS, supra note 51, at 323.
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murdering their female intimates. Indeed, out of a sample of twenty-five
intimate homicide cases in New South Wales between 1824 and 1840,
twenty-one of which involved male defendants, eleven men were convicted
of murder, five were convicted of manslaughter, and another five were
acquitted.53 The case of Matthew Miller, a constable tried for murdering his
wife, provides an apt example. Miller admitted that he strangled his wife
out of jealousy because he suspected her of having a paramour. Yet,
despite citing her infidelity to explain his violence and pleading temporary
insanity, he was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.54 In another
case, William Bowles was executed for the fatal stabbing of his estranged
spouse after the couple separated and the deceased told Bowles she wanted
nothing further to do with him.55
The first opportunity to show leniency toward male killers after arrest
was the charging decision; yet men who killed their wives or girlfriends in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most often faced trial for
murder. Indeed, magistrates and prosecutors were reluctant to accept pleas
to manslaughter in such cases.56 At trial, defendants faced doctrinal
constraints when seeking mitigation based on the deceased’s allegedly
provoking behavior.
Mere words, suspicion of adultery, wifely
drunkenness, and neglect of household duties fell outside the traditional
heat-of-passion categories for much of the nineteenth century,57 and judges
53

See Appendix infra. This data was compiled using DIVISION OF LAW, MACQUARIE
UNIV., DECISIONS OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF NEW SOUTH WALES, 1788-1899, available at
http://www.law.mq.edu.au/scnsw (last visited Nov. 9, 2009).
54
Miller’s sentence was later commuted to transportation for life. R. v. Miller (N.S.W.S.
Ct.
Cas.
1828),
available
at
http://www.law.mq.edu.au/scnsw/
Cases1827-28/html/r_v_miller__1828.htm.
55
R. v. Bowles (N.S.W.S. Ct. Cas. 1835), available at http://www.law.mq.edu.au/
scnsw/cases1835-36/html/r_v_bowles__1835.htm.
56
See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of Public Prosecutors in Historical
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1365-66 (2002); see also WIENER, supra note 43, at
188 (noting that magistrates became more likely to charge male defendants with murder in
wife-killing cases, even when the man had used no weapon and been burdened with a
drunkard spouse).
57
See WIENER, supra note 43, at 178-79, 192 (describing the limits of the provocation
doctrine in nineteenth-century England); Ramsey, Intimate Homicide, supra note 16, at 14452 (describing the narrow application of the provocation defense to male defendants’ cases
in the western and northeastern United States during the late 1800s and early 1900s). In
Australia, insults and female insubordination may have been deemed more provoking than in
the United States. See G.D. WOODS, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN NEW SOUTH WALES:
THE COLONIAL PERIOD, 1788-1900 347 (2002) (noting that a legislative act in 1883 expanded
legally adequate provocation to include “grossly insulting language, or gestures, on the part
of the deceased”). But cf. WILLIAM HATTAM WILKINSON, FREDERICK BUSHBY WILKINSON &
JOHN HUBERT PLUNKETT, THE AUSTRALIAN MAGISTRATE 255 (6th ed. 1894) (stating that,
even after this statutory change, words or gestures were only recognized as provoking “in
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strictly enforced the cooling-time limit as well. Although the provocation
doctrine had begun to be reinterpreted as a concession to human frailty,58 its
limits derived from early-modern foundations, steeped in Aristotelian
philosophy, that saw anger as “driven on by the desire of honour yet
amenable to the rule of reason.”59 A hybrid doctrine that contained
elements of both justification and excuse had emerged, but in the 1800s
courts still held defendants to objective criteria rooted in the normative

certain exceptional cases”) (citing 46 Vic., No. 17, § 370). Some American courts also
began to send verbal provocation cases to the jury in the second half of the nineteenth
century. See Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212 (1862) (stating that the sufficiency of the
provocation generally should be a jury question). However, others still held mere words
insufficient as a matter of law. See, e.g., People v. Turley, 50 Cal. 469, 470 (1862)
(affirming the denial of a heat-of-passion instruction for a defendant who claimed to have
been provoked by “words of reproach only”); see also CHARLES FAIRALL, CRIMINAL LAW
AND PROCEDURE OF CALIFORNIA INCLUDING THE PENAL CODE OF CALIFORNIA 276 (1906)
(stating that “words of reproach, however grievous,” did not constitute sufficient provocation
in California).
When wifely provocation was at issue, juries, magistrates, and prosecutors seem to
have felt the most sympathy for men whose spouses were intemperate. My research
suggests that, in both the United States and Australia, beating cases involving alcoholic
victims were sometimes charged as manslaughter or reduced to this lesser offense in the guilt
phase. See, e.g., Coversheet and Deposition of Charles Mackin, surgeon, Queen v. Balmer,
Case 12, Unit 245 (1862), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS 30/P/O, Public Record Office
Victoria (PROV) (on file with author) (showing that a habitual wife-abuser was only charged
with and convicted of manslaughter for fatally beating his intemperate spouse); Untitled,
ARGUS (Melbourne, Austl.), Dec. 18, 1862, at 5 (on file with author) (reporting that a jury
found Nathaniel Gardiner guilty of manslaughter, not murder, for killing his drunken wife
when she spoke impudently to him); Wife Murder, ARGUS, Dec. 19, 1862, at 7 (on file with
author) (further noting that the victim in the Gardiner case failed to cook her husband’s
dinner); see also Ramsey, supra note 16, at 115-16 (discussing American manslaughter cases
in which men fatally beat their drunken wives); cf. WIENER, supra note 43, at 192 (“Even if
judges thought a beating death of a drunken wife were indeed murder, as was increasingly
happening from the 1860s, juries were reluctant to agree.”).
58
For example, by 1872, voluntary manslaughter was formally designated an
“excusable” homicide in California. THE PENAL CODE OF CALIFORNIA 54, ¶ 195 (1872); see
also FAIRALL, supra note 57, at 276 (“It is only out of regard for human frailty that the law
will extenuate murder to manslaughter.”). This gradual evolution of the doctrine had begun
in Australia by the end of the nineteenth century as well. See WILKINSON, WILKINSON &
PLUNKETT, supra note 57, at 148 (stating that provoked killings were not excusable, but that
“the law pays regard to human frailty as not to put a hasty and a deliberate act on the same
footing with regard to guilt”).
59
HORDER, supra note 35, at 43. Early modern “judges and commentators gave the
element of excuse little by way of attention compared with the element of justification for
action in anger.” Id. at 85. The defendant was not completely exonerated, however, because
he had overreacted by killing the provoker. The manslaughter conviction reflected a
judgment that he had inflicted too much (disproportionate) retribution. See id. at 52. Horder
notes that, in the nineteenth century, the original justifying categories remained largely
intact, even as provocation began to be recast as loss of self-control. See id. at 87.
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assumption that “a reasonable man should exercise patience and
forbearance” in the face of most kinds of abuse.60
Even the most strongly gendered category of legally provoking victim
behavior—sudden discovery of one’s wife in the act of adultery—was
limited to that scenario. Thus, despite the nineteenth-century obsession
with female chastity, appellate courts affirmed murder convictions of men
who killed their allegedly unfaithful wives after a time lapse or upon mere
suspicion of adultery.61 The gradual shift toward seeing provocation as loss
of self-control did not preclude courts in the past from concluding that “[a]
man may deliberate, may premeditate and intend to kill . . . and to a large
extent be controlled by passion at the time.”62 Such jealous husbands
received first-degree murder convictions and sometimes even the death
penalty. Indeed, as Adrian Howe notes, “more than fifty years ago an
English judge pronounced Othello guilty of murder. In his eyes, there was
nothing morally ambiguous about the slaughter of his wife, even if Iago had
been telling the truth.”63
Outside the iconic category of witnessed infidelity, the criminal law of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries refused to recognize a
woman’s attempt to leave a man as legally adequate provocation. Thus, in
New York in 1896, a male defendant was convicted of capital murder for
following his wife to a neighboring house and fatally shooting her when she
separated from him and threatened to seek a divorce.64 Such convictions
and punishments were common in late nineteenth-century New York and
elsewhere in the United States. The case of Sidney Solomon in New South
Wales, Australia, provides another compelling example. Solomon beat,
choked, and punched his wife during her pregnancy. After the couple
60
FAIRALL, supra note 57, at 276 (explaining why “words of reproach” were not
sufficient provocation in California).
61
See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 48 P. 803, 803-04 (Cal. 1897) (“While ‘the sight of
adultery committed by his wife’ may be . . . sufficient provocation to the husband which will
justify that ‘heat of passion’ which is sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter, the
knowledge of such fact must be based on something more tangible than mere surmise, and
the knowledge must be so recent as to preclude the idea of cooling time or premeditation.”).
A similar legal situation prevailed in Victorian England. See WIENER, supra note 43, at 230
(“Mere jealousy was not to be allowed as mitigation for taking life, and indeed was harshly
condemned, especially so in the later years of the [nineteenth] century, when such cases
almost always produced murder verdicts, and nearly all of these convicts were left to
hang.”).
62
People v. Jones, 2 N.E. 49, 52 (N.Y. 1885) (affirming a first-degree murder conviction
of a defendant for fatally shooting his first wife).
63
Adrian Howe, Provocation in Crisis—Law’s Passion at the Crossroads? New
Directions for Feminist Strategists, 21 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 53, 67-68 (2004).
64
See People v. Youngs, 45 N.E. 460, 460-61 (N.Y. 1896) (noting that the facts of this
case, in which the defendant claimed insanity, also did not show any provocation).
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separated, Solomon came to his in-laws’ house, asking for twenty pounds.
His father-in-law reminded him of a bond to keep the peace that he had
posted and threw him off the property. Solomon left, accompanied by his
wife, but shot her to death in the street. A jury convicted him of capital
murder in 1930, although his sentence was subsequently commuted to penal
servitude for life.65
Courts and juries also treated the lethal rage of spurned suitors with
severity; in fact, unmarried men had even less success claiming provocation
than cuckolded or abandoned husbands did.66 As Carolyn Strange remarks
about nineteenth-century Australia, “[i]n a period when informal
heterosexual unions were still frowned upon in respectable circles, and
when marriage was the key marker of adult status for men and women,
unmarried men had greater difficulty than husbands did when it came to
convincing respectable men that their femicidal violence was
understandable.”67 Similarly, in the United States, both the formal law and
social mores “condemned vengeful conduct by rejected suitors as ‘cowardly
and unmanly.’”68
The sentencing of men convicted of intimate murder varied. In some
jurisdictions, such as the American state of New York, the capital
punishment of wife-killers constituted a remarkably high percentage of total
executions.69 Wiener contends that, in England, “the later nineteenth
century saw an increase in the level of punishment for wife-killing,
particularly as compared with other killings” and notes that hangings of
65

See Clerk of the Peace, Register of Cases Heard Before the Central Criminal Court,
1923-1930, 19/13210, at 499 (Sidney Solomon, 1930), State Record Office New South
Wales (“SRNSW”) (on file with author) (recording the conviction); Coversheet, Rex v.
Solomon, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit
Courts, 9/7321 (1930, Central), SRNSW (on file with author) (same); Solomon Case:
Sentence Commuted, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 28, 1930, at 13 (on file with author)
(reporting that Solomon’s death sentence was commuted to imprisonment for life). For
information on the couple’s separation and the victim’s pregnancy, see Deposition of
Bernard Montgomery Garland, Coroner’s Inquest, at 14-15, Rex v. Solomon, Clerk of the
Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7321 (1930,
Central), SRNSW (on file with author). For information about the events immediately
preceding the victim’s death, see Deposition of Phyllis Maude Garland, Coroner’s Inquest at
11, 13, Rex v. Solomon, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court
and Circuit Courts, 9/7321 (1930, Central), SRNSW (on file with author). Sidney
Solomon’s case, as well as those of other Australian wife-killers, will be analyzed in greater
detail in my forthcoming legal history of public responses to intimate-partner violence in
Australia and the American West.
66
See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 16, at 151-52 (discussing the case of Martin Foy, who
was executed in New York in 1893 for the stalking murder of his former paramour).
67
Strange, supra note 43, at 324.
68
Ramsey, supra note 16, at 152.
69
See id. at 156, 158 tbl.4.
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Englishmen who murdered their spouses were on the rise in the 1890s.70 In
Australia, male prisoners were more likely to serve prison terms for killing
their wives or girlfriends than to hang for it. Yet such outcomes often
resulted from the commutation of death sentences for murder, rather than
from jury leniency or legal doctrines favoring men.71 Moreover, some male
prisoners in Victoria and other Australian jurisdictions went to the gallows
for killing female intimates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.72
C. THE DEFENSE OF WOMEN WHO KILLED MALE INTIMATES

The legal treatment of intimate homicide in the past occurred in a
system that precluded women’s full citizenship. Females were presumed
physically and emotionally weak, barred from the sphere of business and
politics, and deemed in need of protection from more powerful, worldly
men.73 The law of coverture rendered wives unequal, subordinate, and
dependent throughout much of the nineteenth century.74
70

WIENER, supra note 43, at 164; see id. at 210.
See Strange, supra note 43, at 310-11, 315.
72
For an example of a capital intimate-murder case that resulted in execution, see
Register of Decisions on Capital Sentences, 1851-1889 (John McDonald, 1860), VPRS
7583/P0001/1, PROV (on file with author) (recording McDonald’s execution); see also
Untitled, ARGUS (Austl.), Sept. 4, 1860 at 4 (on file with author) (“The man McDonald lately
convicted of the murder of his wife, under circumstances of peculiar atrocity, at Ironbark
Gully, Bendigo, was executed yesterday morning . . . .”). For an example of gubernatorial
clemency toward a wife-killer from the same time period, see Register of Decisions on
Capital Sentences, 1851-1889, VPRS 7583/P0001/1 (William Smith, 1860), PROV (on file
with author) (noting commutation of death sentence to imprisonment for life with hard labor
and three years in irons); see also Deposition of Dr. William Tarrant Merson, Coroner’s
Inquest, Queen v. Smith, Case 3-339-31, Unit 136 (1860), Criminal Trial Briefs, VPRS
30/P/0, PROV (on file with author) (stating that deceased had a broken neck and that she had
also been whipped and kicked with nailed boots). The case of John McDonald, as well as
those of other Australian wife-killers, will be analyzed in greater detail in my forthcoming
legal history of public responses to intimate-partner violence in Australia and the American
West. The relatively comprehensive empirical data available for New South Wales indicates
that, despite the mandatory death penalty for murder, less than 10% of sixty-four intimate
femicide and attempted femicide convictions between 1890 and 1920 resulted in executions.
See Strange, supra note 43, at 315. Thus, gubernatorial clemency based on provocation
claims was common in Australian wife-murder cases, but any domestic discount that existed
“did not amount to carte blanche for men to kill women.” Id. at 311.
73
See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 126.
74
See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 121 (2000); see also
BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 430-32 (explaining the concept of coverture); Hilary Golder
and Diane Kirkby, Marriage and Divorce Before the Family Law Act 1975, in SEX, POWER,
AND JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 156 (discussing the implications of coverture in nineteenthcentury Australia); Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address to the Legislature of the State of New
York (1854), in 1 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848-1861 595-99, 602-05 (Elizabeth
71
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Such inequality did not mean that women were disproportionately
convicted of murder, however. Rather, by the early nineteenth century, a
diminution of “powerful fears and horror earlier evoked by female killers,
in contrast to the hardening attitudes toward violent men” was evident in
the criminal courts.75 Data from such American states as New York,
Colorado, and Illinois suggest that juries acquitted women or convicted
them of manslaughter much more often than murder.76 In England,
decisions not to prosecute defensive husband-killings or to commute death
sentences in such cases increased. Wife-killers in the last third of the
nineteenth century were “slightly more likely to be found guilty” and
“much more likely to be hanged” than husband-killers.77 Although the
available empirical evidence indicates higher conviction rates for women
charged with killing their male intimates in Australia than in England or the
United States, just under half of all female murder defendants were
acquitted in a Sydney suburb in the late nineteenth century.78 When
Australian women turned to deadly weapons instead of poison, which was
associated with premeditated killings, they enjoyed greater success in
raising provocation defenses.79
Exculpation or mitigation for accused women took two forms, which
were sometimes intertwined: the justification of a wronged woman’s lethal
act or the sympathetic acceptance of an insanity theory.80 Insanity
determinations even led to the dismissal of the case before trial if the
woman was deemed completely delusional.81 In contrast, wronged
Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Grange eds., reprint ed. 1985)
(describing women’s legal, political, and social disabilities in the mid-nineteenth-century
United States).
75
WIENER, supra note 43, at 123; see Ramsey, supra note 16, at 105, 139-44, 176-78
(observing this contrast later in the nineteenth century).
76
Jeffrey S. Adler, “I Loved Joe But I Had to Kill Him”: Homicide by Women in Turnof-the-Century Chicago, 92. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 867, 883-84 (2002) (showing that
“every white woman who killed her husband [in Chicago] between August, 1905 and
October, 1918 was exonerated or acquitted, totaling thirty-five consecutive cases”); Ramsey,
supra note 16, at 121-22 tbls.1-2 (presenting data from New York County, New York, and
Denver County, Colorado).
77
WIENER, supra note 43, at 165-66; see id. at 132-33, 149 (discussing non-prosecution
and clemency).
78
ALLEN, supra note 51, at 41.
79
See id. at 111.
80
See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 128.
81
This occurred, for example, in the case of Sarah Elizabeth McDonald, who was
charged with poisoning her husband in New South Wales in 1930. After being certified
insane, McDonald was confined to the Parramatta Mental Hospital. See NEW SOUTH WALES
POLICE GAZETTE, NRS 10958, Reel 3606, at 325, SRNSW (on file with author); Insane
Woman Poisons Husband, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, March 8, 1930, at 21 (on file with
author).
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women’s cases typically involved a homicide that defense lawyers
characterized as either the jilted woman’s honor-killing of her unfaithful
seducer or an act of self-defense against a violent spouse.82 Homicide
scenarios considered “justifiable” in the late 1800s and early 1900s were
thus remarkable for the degree of moral condemnation directed at the
deceased man who drove the female defendant to kill.
In confrontational self-defense cases involving close temporal
proximity between the deceased’s attack and the defendant’s use of lethal
force, the law allowed evidence of past domestic violence to be admitted.
Female defendants could thus obtain acquittal on the basis of a self-defense
instruction.83 For example, in New South Wales in 1910, a jury found
Caroline Buckman not guilty of murder for fatally shooting her abusive
husband when he ran over her on his horse and attacked her with a stick.84
Non-confrontational cases posed greater difficulties for the defense, as
they do today. Courts often told the jury not to consider past-abuse
evidence if there had been no imminent attack. In Victoria in 1884, for
instance, Mary Silk was convicted and sentenced to death for murdering her
brutal, drunken husband, who had allegedly threatened her with a gun and
committed incest with their daughter. The jury wanted to extend mercy “on
account of her husband’s flagrant misconduct, but so much time intervened
after this misconduct and the pursuit of his wife with a gun before any
82
See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 118-21, 130 (analyzing New York cases involving
female defendants who were acquitted of murder after killing their seducers); see id. at 125,
133-36 (discussing acquittals and lesser-included offense verdicts for women who killed
physically abusive men). But cf. Marianne Constable, Chicago Husband-Killing and the
“New Unwritten Law”, 124 TRIQUARTERLY 85, 88 (2006) (stating that women who killed
husbands out of fear were often acquitted, whereas cases involving jealousy or betrayal
“tended to be cases that led to conviction”).
83
See Ramsey, supra note 16, at 129-30 (discussing People v. Taylor, 69 N.E. 534 (N.Y.
1904), in which an appellate court found the exclusion of past-abuse evidence to be
prejudicial error); see also WIENER, supra note 43, at 132 (discussing the self-defense
acquittal of Harriet Webster in England in 1858); Constable, supra note 82, at 91 (stating
that jury instructions and verdicts in Chicago cases as early as 1905 show that a female
defendant might be exonerated if she “honestly believed she was in great danger of losing
her life”).
84
See Supreme Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Register of Criminal Indictments (19071919), 9/2635, Reel 1861 at 88 (on file with author) (recording acquittal); Coversheet, Rex v.
Buckman, Clerk of the Peace, Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit
Courts, 9/7157 (1910, Armidale), SRNSW (on file with author) (same). For the defendant’s
account of the events immediately preceding the shooting, see Deposition of Caroline
Augusta Buckman, Coroner’s Inquest at 55, Rex v. Buckman, Clerk of the Peace,
Depositions and Papers of the Supreme Court and Circuit Courts, 9/7157 (1910, Armidale),
SRNSW (on file with author). Caroline Buckman’s case and those of other Australian
husband-killers will be analyzed in greater detail in my forthcoming legal history of public
responses to intimate-partner violence in Australia and the American West.
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violence was inflicted by the prisoner as to preclude either being considered
as any palliation at law.”85 Although the imminence requirement prevented
an acquittal, the governor commuted Silk’s death sentence to twenty years
in prison with hard labor.86
American and English juries often exonerated female defendants or
found them guilty of the lesser offense of manslaughter when the evidence
indicated they had suffered past abuse at the deceased’s hands. These
verdicts sometimes nullified instructions stating that brutal conduct did not
justify or excuse murder.87 Yet judges also occasionally acknowledged the
relevance of past-abuse evidence to justifiable homicide in nonconfrontational situations, indicating a willingness to expand the time frame
to consider events that occurred prior to the lethal incident.88
Defense attorneys sometimes blended the images of the wronged
woman and the hysterical female, even when the defendant’s emotions and
beliefs had some moral legitimacy. Yet cases of women charged with
killing their male partners in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
nevertheless demonstrated the presence of two avenues to mitigation or
acquittal. The depiction of female defendants as frail bundles of nerves
might arouse sympathy, but juries were equally capable of taking the past
history of the relationship into account and recognizing both the battered
spouse and the violent man she killed as rational actors whose conduct
should be judged by prevailing moral standards.
D. THE EXPANSION OF THE PROVOCATION DOCTRINE

In countries whose law derived from the English model, the
provocation doctrine eventually underwent dramatic expansion. Changes in
85

Report on the Case of Mary Ann Silk by Chief Justice William Stawell, March 19,
1885, Queen v. Silk, Unit 11 (1884), Victoria Capital Case Files, VPRS 264/P/0, PROV (on
file with author). Mary Silk’s case and those of other Australian husband-killers will be
analyzed in greater detail in my forthcoming legal history of public responses to intimatepartner violence in Australia and the American West.
86
See Register of Decisions on Capital Sentences, 1851-1889 (Mary Ann Silk, 1884),
VPRS 7583/P0001/1, PROV (on file with author).
87
See, e.g., WIENER, supra note 43, at 131-32 (describing judicial and jury sympathy for
battered women who killed their abusers in Victorian England); Ramsey, supra note 16, at
125, 135-36 (discussing the cases of Beatrice Gordon and Carmella Fiorini, whose stories of
abuse aroused jury sympathy in early twentieth-century Colorado); cf. Constable, supra note
81, at 89 (speculating that the “new unwritten law” in Chicago may have been “an early
version of something like a battered woman’s syndrome defense” in cases involving killings
that “occurred during the course of one of many struggles”).
88
For example, the New York Court of Appeals found prejudicial error in a decision to
exclude evidence of the deceased’s past rape of the defendant, which would have
contextualized the defendant’s homicidal response to his refusal to marry her. See Ramsey,
supra note 16, at 130 (discussing People v. Barbieri, 43 N.E. 635 (N.Y. 1896)).
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the 1800s involved a greater focus on loss of self-control, as opposed to
defense of honor; yet the retention of the limited, common law categories of
adequate provocation preserved legal boundaries reflecting moral
judgments about defendants’ emotions and beliefs. By contrast, the
twentieth century brought statutory and judge-made alterations that
individualized the doctrine and made it much more subjective.
The new excuse-based approach seemed to point “inexorably towards
the conclusion that whatever the provocation, be it serious or trivial, if it is
found as a matter of empirical fact that defendants genuinely lost selfcontrol before killing, the killing should be reduced to manslaughter.”89
Not all jurisdictions went so far, but many journeyed a good ways down
this road. The modern standard in Australia will be described below.90 In
Britain and Canada, judicial decisions excused men’s violent rage and
jealousy in ever widening scenarios. Britain modestly extended the
reasonable person test to include sex and age in the 1970s,91 but in the 2001
case of Regina v. Smith, the House of Lords authorized the jury to consider
any “characteristic of the accused, whether temporary or permanent” that
reasonably affected his ability to exercise self-control.92 Canadian
decisions abandoned the “mere words” exclusion and allowed juries to
mitigate whenever the defendant’s traits or background “give the act or
insult in question a special significance.”93
In the United States, the adoption by a substantial minority of
jurisdictions of an EMED defense, based on Model Penal Code proposals,
completely severed voluntary manslaughter from provocation and
justifiable emotion. The Code directs the jury to decide whether the
defendant killed “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse,” but
further requires that this reasonableness analysis be done “from the
viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he
believes them to be.”94 The Commentaries attempt to clarify that
89

HORDER, supra note 35, at 95.
See infra notes 101-19 and accompanying text.
91
Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Camplin, [1978] A.C. 705 (H.L.).
92
R. v. Smith (Morgan), [2001] 1 A.C. 146 (H.L.). In recent years, however, the
provocation defense has come under fire in Britain and, under the Coroners and Justice Act
of 2009, it will be replaced with a new partial defense of “loss of control” for killings in
response to fear or to a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. Coroners and Justice
Act, 2009, c. 25, Part 2, Ch. 1, §§ 54-56; see also infra notes 308-12 and accompanying text
(discussing Britain’s reforms).
93
See Caroline Forell, Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the
United States, Canada, and Australia, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 27, 48 (2006)
[hereinafter Forell, Gender Equality] (discussing R. v. Thibert [1996] S.C.R. 37 (Can.)).
94
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962).
90
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“idiosyncratic moral values are not part of the actor’s situation.”95 But by
instructing on EMED in cases in which a man killed his girlfriend’s lover
for taunting him,96 strangled a prostitute due to unrelated stress in his life,97
fatally shot a former partner for dancing with another man,98 or committed
homicide for myriad other barely explicable reasons, American courts come
close to affirming the defendant’s aberrant valuations.
The Model Penal Code approach repudiates the traditional coolingtime limit and indicates that the victim-as-provocateur does not need to
have played a catalytic role. Indeed, no triggering event is required. A
killer who brooded over his homicidal feelings, without even having a fully
comprehensible desire for revenge, remains eligible for manslaughter
mitigation. Such evasiveness about moral judgment puts great weight on
the opinion of psychiatrists whose testimony may distract from a
commonsense understanding that the killing arose from the defendant’s
depraved valuations.99 Unmoored from common law constraints, the
EMED defense allows a sympathetic psychological expert to reinterpret the
defendant’s history of increasingly brutal dominance over the victim as a
logical progression from emotional trauma to uncontrollable violence. Of
course, the jury need not believe the expert, but allowing the broad defense
in the first place, without providing any fixed standard to guide jury
deliberation, erodes the criminal law’s legitimacy and creates the potential
for inconsistent, arbitrary results.
Expansive manslaughter mitigation thus partially excuses separation
assaults and other homicides that the nineteenth-century provocation
doctrine never contemplated. As we shall see, a similar change occurred in
Australia, and it coincided with the “medicalization” of self-defense law.100
Indeed, rather than eschewing images of female irrationality that sometimes
conjured jury sympathy in the 1800s, the defense of battered women who
killed their abusers has, in recent decades, relied even more heavily on
psychological theories. Neither the subjectivization of the provocation
doctrine nor the advent of the BWS strategy has benefitted women

95

MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3 cmt., at 62-63 (1980).
People v. Harris, 740 N.E.2d 227, 229-31 (N.Y. 2000) (holding that the jury should
have been instructed on EMED at trial of defendant for killing victim who taunted him about
his girlfriend’s past and likely future infidelity).
97
State v. Kaddah, 736 A.2d 902, 910-12 (Conn. 1999) (noting that an EMED
instruction was properly given in this case).
98
LEE, supra note 14, at 36-38.
99
See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 325.
100
See infra notes 121-31 and accompanying text (describing the medicalization of selfdefense law, as well as such mitigating claims as diminished responsibility).
96
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collectively in the long run, even though the latter did achieve acquittals for
some horrifically abused defendants.
Abolishing or at least sharply circumscribing partial excuses for loss of
self-control would help combat stereotypes of violent rage as a normal
aspect of masculinity, while allowing the defense of women as rational
actors whose resort to lethal force constituted a legitimate response to lifethreatening abuse. Nineteenth-century moral judgment tracked nineteenthcentury values; in an age before women could vote, attitudes toward female
victims and defendants were unsurprisingly paternalistic. Yet, because
excuses have in the end proved more illiberal than justifications, it may be
time to embrace the latter, reinterpreted in light of modern equality norms.
III. INTIMATE-PARTNER HOMICIDE AND THE ABOLITION OF THE
PROVOCATION DOCTRINE IN AUSTRALIA
A. HOMICIDE DEFENSES IN AUSTRALIA BEFORE THE REFORMS

Prior to the twenty-first century campaign to abolish the provocation
doctrine, partial defenses to murder in Australia evolved toward an excuseoriented focus on the overthrow of reason by emotion.101 The evolution of
the provocation doctrine in Australia paralleled trends in the United States,
Britain, and Canada. Part III.A considers the state of the pre-reform law as
a prelude to discussing the recent legislative changes in Tasmania, Victoria,
and Western Australia.
1. Provoking Conduct and Loss of Self-Control
The provocation doctrine in modern Australia operates as an excuse.102
According to a VLRC publication describing the pre-abolition state of the
law in Victoria, “[t]he focus of the defence of provocation has . . . become
the accused’s loss of self-control, rather than justifiable retribution . . . .
The defence is now generally seen to be a ‘concession to human frailty,’
rather than an appropriate response to a breach of honour.”103 The
availability of manslaughter mitigation for the 2003 killing of Melbourne
socialite Julie Ramage provides an example. James Ramage received an
eleven-year manslaughter sentence with an eight-year non-parole period for
beating and strangling his estranged wife to death after she allegedly
insulted his lack of sexual prowess, admitted to having a lover, and told him

101

See infra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
VICT. LAW REFORM COMM’N, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE ISSUES PAPER 43 (2002)
[hereinafter VLRC, ISSUES PAPER].
103
Id.
102
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their marriage was over.104 Mental health professionals testified that
Ramage had become “extremely anxious, obsessed and emotionally
fraught” when his wife left him,105 and the trial judge allowed the jury to
find provocation based on mere words, despite lack of clarity in Australian
law regarding whether mere words suffice.106
Australia’s states and territories have applied the provocation doctrine
in slightly different ways.107 However, for more than a decade, they have
been guided by a series of Australian High Court decisions, culminating in
Stingel v. Regina, in which all members of the Court agreed upon an
“ordinary person” test that freed the partial defense from specified
categories of provoking conduct.108 According to this two-part test, the jury
can consider the characteristics of the accused in measuring the gravity of
the provocation, but it is still instructed to decide whether an ordinary
person would have reacted the way the accused did.109 Characteristics of
the accused relevant to the first part of the test include “age, sex, race,
ethnicity, physical features, personal attributes, personal relationships or
past history.”110 “Personal attributes” may encompass “mental instability or
weakness.”111 In Victoria, changes to the traditional requirements prior to
the 2005 statutory reforms also involved the demise of the cooling-time
limit and the recognition of cumulative effects producing a loss of selfcontrol.112
Thus, Victoria’s common law doctrine was only slightly less
subjective than the American EMED defense. Compared to the traditional
view of legally adequate provocation, it greatly expanded the class of
defendants who could claim mitigation. Modification of the objective
standard in Australia arose, at least in part, from the well-meaning goal of
making the criminal law more inclusive in a multi-cultural society. The
desire to judge immigrants and aboriginal people by standards reflecting

104

See Bernadette McSherry, Men Behaving Badly: Current Issues in Provocation,
Automatism, Mental Impairment and Criminal Responsibility, 12 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. &
L. 15, 16-17 (2005); see also PHIL CLEARY, GETTING AWAY WITH MURDER: THE TRUE STORY
OF JULIE RAMAGE’S DEATH 28-30 (2005).
105
McSherry, supra note 104, at 17.
106
See Bernadette McSherry, Afterword: Option for the Reform of Provocation,
Automatism and Mental Impairment, 12 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 44, 45 (2005)
(discussing whether mere words constitute adequate provocation under Australian law).
107
Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 93, at 38.
108
Stingel v. R. (1990) 171 C.L.R 312.
109
Masciantonio v. R. (1995) 183 C.L.R 58; Stingel v. R. (1990) 171 C.L.R 312.
110
Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 326; see VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 25.
111
Stingel, 171 C.L.R. at 326; see VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 25.
112
See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 24.
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their own values played a significant role,113 as did the acknowledgement
that battered women might kill after a prolonged period of abuse.114
However, despite these good intentions, the expansion of the doctrine had
negative consequences for substantive gender equality. Prior to its abolition
in Victoria, the partial defense resulted in manslaughter verdicts for socalled sexual rage killers without any requirement that the defendant
actually witness an adulterous act and accepted “that it is ‘provocative’ for
women to leave their partners, at least when they ‘flaunt’ their new
relationship.”115
Indeed, as the reformers persuasively argued, the
provocation doctrine operated to excuse male anger and violence toward
women even though, on its face, it applied equally to both sexes.116
Although facially neutral, an excuse-based version of the provocation
defense encourages a stereotype of men as hot-blooded, impulsive, and
unable to control their violent urges. This is especially troubling because an
alternate construction of the facts often suggests a premeditated murder
arising from the defendant’s outrage at his failure to dominate his intimate
partner over a long period of time.117 The Ramage case, for example,
involved evidence that the defendant engaged in many acts to cover up his
crime. In the hours following Julie Ramage’s death, James Ramage buried
her body in a shallow grave in the countryside, washed his car, ordered
some granite countertops, and told family members that he did not know
where his wife had gone.118 These facts, combined with excluded evidence
indicating that James had physically abused Julie in the past,119 suggest that
James could have controlled himself and that the killing was planned
retaliation for Julie’s act of leaving. The social and moral message that
voluntary manslaughter mitigation sends is thus inaccurate and promotes
damaging stereotypes of masculinity.

113

See Simon Bronitt, Visions of a Multicultural Criminal Law: An Australian
Perspective, in MULTICULTURAL JURISPRUDENCE: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
MULTICULTURAL DEFENSE 121, 124-26 (A.D. Renteln & M. Forbes eds., 2009).
114
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 24.
115
Morgan, supra note 42, at 39.
116
See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 27.
117
G.R. Sullivan, Anger and Excuse: Reassessing Provocation, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 421, 427 (1993). For a comparable analysis by an American legal scholar, see Donna
K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter, Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV.
L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 71, 86-87 (1992).
118
See McSherry, supra note 104, at 17.
119
See id. at 21 n.10 (describing the evidentiary rulings); Provocation Ruling, GEELONG
ADVERTISER (Austl.), Dec. 11, 2004, at 38 (reporting that Crown Prosecutor Julian Lecke
said, “Ramage had a history of bullying his wife and had head-butted her and broken her
nose on a previous occasion”).
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2. Self-Protection and Pathology
While feminists in Australia and elsewhere lament the gender-biased
nature of provocation, it nevertheless constitutes a common means of
defending female murder defendants. Restrictions on self-defense in
Australia have often forced battered women who killed their partners to rely
on diminished responsibility or provocation claims.120 Victoria has never
allowed the partial defense of diminished responsibility, but four other
Australian jurisdictions do.121 Where it is successful, it mitigates murder to
manslaughter both for women who kill after a prolonged history of abuse
and for men who contend they lost control when their female partner ended
the relationship.122 Yet defense efforts to claim diminished responsibility
using psychiatric testimony do not always succeed,123 and mitigation comes
at the expense of depicting the defendant as mentally abnormal.
Australian women accused of non-confrontational intimate homicides
in the recent past had to rely on provocation or diminished responsibility
claims. Prior to the 1987 ruling in Zecevic v. Director of Public
Prosecutions,124 exculpation on self-defense grounds in Victoria clearly
required an imminent threat of death or bodily harm to the accused. Zecevic
purported to eliminate the imminence requirement for all self-defense
120
See Stubbs & Tolmie, Battered Woman Syndrome in Australia, supra note 18, at 192;
see also Morgan, supra note 42, at 41-43 (discussing the use of the provocation doctrine to
defend battered women accused of murdering their partners); Violet Roberts: Justifiable
Homicide?, 5 LEGAL SERV. BULL. 63, 63-64 (1980) (describing Australian murder cases
from the 1970s in which battered women sought to defend against murder charges by
pleading diminished responsibility).
121
VLRC, ISSUES PAPER, supra note 102, at 83; see also VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE,
supra note 8, at 232-33 (noting that the diminished responsibility claim is available in the
Australian Capital Territory, Queensland, New South Wales, and the Northern Territory).
122
VLRC, ISSUES PAPER, supra note 102, at 83.
123
See generally Violet Roberts: Justifiable Homicide?, supra note 120 (describing the
murder conviction of Violet Roberts and her son, Bruce, for the fatal shooting of Violet’s
violently abusive husband in 1975). A jury found both mother and son guilty of murder,
even though Violet, who had repeatedly attempted suicide, claimed diminished responsibility
based on depressive illness. Violet received a life sentence. Bruce admitted to pulling the
trigger while Eric slept, but he only got fourteen years. See Debbie Kirkwood, Heather
Osland: Still in Prison, 6 WOMEN AGAINST VIOLENCE 60, 62 (1999) (on file with author)
(comparing the Roberts case to the similar facts of Osland v. R.). After sentencing, a heated
campaign for the Roberts’ release led to a twenty-thousand-signature petition, a half-page
advertisement in the Sydney Morning Herald, and acts of the protest that included breaking
into government ministers’ offices, spray-painting the walls of the cabinet room, and
throwing cream buns at politicians. Id.; see Violet and Bruce Roberts: Released, 5 LEGAL
SERV. BULL. 312, 312 (1980) (on file with author) (describing civil disobedience in the
campaign to secure the Roberts’ release). Violet and Bruce Roberts were released from
prison in October 1980 after serving about five years. See jd.
124
Zecevic v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions (Vict.) (1987) 162 C.L.R 645 (Austl.).
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claims, not just those raised by abuse victims.125 Thereafter in Victoria,
imminence counted as one factor, among others, relevant to whether the
accused believed it was necessary to kill in self-defense.126 Yet, according
to one scholar,
[s]ome courts . . . continued to interpret the factors of self-defence in terms of what is
reasonable for the average . . . middle class white male, rather than what a battered
woman might reasonably do. Accordingly, in most cases in which women have been
acquitted to date, they killed immediately (as defined in seconds) after their partner
assaulted them.127

The arrival of BWS evidence in Australia in the early 1990s
exacerbated the trend toward depicting murder defendants as mentally
abnormal, rather than as rational actors whose behavior could be examined
for moral appropriateness. Originally developed by American psychologist
Lenore Walker, this syndrome theory posits an escalating three-phase cycle
of violence that includes “tension-building,” an “acute battering incident,”
and “loving contrition.” A woman who has experienced the cycle remains
in the abusive relationship, according to Walker, because she suffers from
“learned helplessness” that causes her to believe she cannot change her
circumstances.128 BWS, which is now generally considered a form of posttraumatic stress disorder,129 does not constitute a separate defense in
Australia, and part of the problem with it inheres in courts’ mishandling of
its admissibility. Australian judges began admitting expert testimony on the
syndrome with “little or no debate about its nature or relevance . . . [or
attention] to questions about what the introduction of BWS is intended to
achieve.”130 Thus, while BWS expert testimony has increasingly been
paired with social-context evidence in the United States, Australian courts
construed it narrowly as a psychological explanation of female defendants’
behavior, starting “from the notion that battered women have developed
different perceptions from other people.”131
BWS evidence underpinned the self-defense claims of several
Australian women acquitted for killing sleeping husbands. In each of these
instances, the deceased issued a verbal death threat or committed a violent
125
Id. at 661, 665 (holding that for a successful self-defense claim, the defendant must
have reasonably believed that lethal force was necessary, but not requiring that the threat
must have been imminent); see RENATA ALEXANDER, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AUSTRALIA:
THE LEGAL RESPONSE 24, 26 (2002); Stubbs & Tolmie, Falling Short, supra note 1, at 733.
126
See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 8, at 76 (describing pre-reform selfdefense law in Victoria).
127
LESS THAN EQUAL, supra note 10, at 46.
128
WALKER, supra note 14, at 42-63.
129
Stark, supra note 38, 974.
130
Stubbs & Tolmie, Falling Short, supra note 1, at 720-21.
131
Id. at 722.
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assault that could be construed as an ongoing threat in close temporal
proximity to the homicide.132
However, one of Australia’s most
controversial “sleeping husband” cases, Osland v. Regina,133 demonstrated
the High Court’s unwillingness to provide strong authority for preemptive
strikes. It also suggested the dangers of creating dichotomous images of the
cold-blooded killer and the pitiable abuse victim with no satisfactory
intermediate option between a murder verdict and an acquittal.
Heather Osland spent thirteen years of her life with Frank Osland, a
man who was significantly taller and heavier than she.134 During this time,
Frank used violence to maintain rigid control over the household. His past
acts against Heather allegedly included repeatedly punching and kicking
her, holding a gun to her head, pushing her under water in the bath, pulling
her hair, causing bruises where they would not show, and forcing her to
have anal intercourse. He augmented this ongoing cruelty by killing the
family’s pet rabbits, birds, and a dog, as well as by committing numerous
acts of violence against the children.135 Efforts to obtain protection from
the police were ineffectual.136 Heather claimed that, during the days
immediately preceding Frank’s death, “his violence toward her was
‘building up.’”137 The deceased ordered Heather’s son David out of the
house, but David was afraid to leave because of the harm he predicted the
deceased might inflict on his mother. Heather and David dug a hole in the
countryside near Bendigo, Victoria, after becoming fearful that the
deceased would react violently to their failure to purchase some household
items. On the night of the homicide, the deceased inflicted verbal abuse on
Heather and struck David, knocking him to the ground. In secret, Heather
put sleeping tablets in the deceased’s coffee to calm him, but she and her
son subsequently became alarmed about what the deceased might do when
he realized he had been drugged. While the deceased slept, David struck
him a fatal blow with a piece of metal pipe. David and Heather then buried
the deceased and acted as if he had simply disappeared.138
132

Id. at 733-35 (discussing the unreported Tassone case in the Northern Territory, as
well as DPP v. Secretary, (1996) 5 NTLR 96 (appeal)).
133
Osland v. R. (1998) 197 C.L.R 316.
134
Id. at 388, ¶ 185 (Callinan, J.) (noting size disparity); Kirkwood, supra note 123, at 61
(noting the length of the Oslands’ relationship).
135
See Scutt, supra note 18, at 102-03; see also Osland, 197 C.L.R at 388, ¶ 185
(Callinan, J.) (remarking on evidence of child abuse and Heather’s testimony about being
forced to engage in anal intercourse with the deceased); Australian Story: Interview with
Heather
Osland,
Nov.
2,
2005,
available
at
http://www.abc.net.au/
austory/content/2005/s1495856.htm (describing the killing of the family dog, Adam).
136
See Scutt, supra note 18, at 110.
137
Osland, 197 C.L.R at 321, ¶ 192 (Callinan, J.).
138
Id. at 321, ¶ 4 (Gaudron & Gummow, JJ., dissenting).
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Although supporters of Heather Osland castigated “false feminists” for
daring to suggest that she was not “the best poster child” for the battered
women’s cause,139 some aspects of the case could be interpreted as signs of
premeditation. In addition to the use of sedatives and the hole dug prior to
the homicide, the prosecution introduced evidence that Heather had offered
another son money to kill Frank and then threatened him with violence if he
testified against her.140 Intercepted phone conversations also tended to cast
doubt on whether Frank had been violent in the later years of their
marriage.141 Heather relied on BWS evidence and was convicted of murder,
despite raising both self-defense and provocation claims. Her conviction
was upheld on appeal to the High Court.142 Heather’s son, who did not
claim to suffer from any syndrome, was exonerated in a second trial after a
hung jury in the first one.143 According to one source, the sentence of
fourteen years and six months that Heather received ranks among the
longest in decades in Australia for this type of crime.144
Australians’ polarized views of the Osland case reflect efforts to
assimilate complicated facts into a simpler narrative of what happened.
Heather probably was neither an innocent, passive victim, nor a coldly
calculating killer. Because her behavior did not accord with the stereotypes
that the criminal law, BWS theory, or cultural values surrounding intimatepartner violence demand, her story had to be reshaped to fit a legal verdict.
The murder conviction expressed (and the High Court affirmed) a
distinction between “a self-defensive response to a grave danger which can
only be understood in light of a history of abusive conduct and a response
that simply involves a deliberate desire to exact revenge for past and
potential—but unthreatened—future conduct.”145
In reality, however, Heather’s behavior may have fallen between these
understandings of why abuse victims kill. To the extent that she engaged in
planning activity by digging the hole and using the sedatives, her conduct
showed self-protectiveness, as well as anger and desperation. If she is an
icon for anything, it may be a new form of mitigation that covers defensive
killings in which the lethal act is deemed less justifiable than the emotions
and beliefs prompting it.146 Such a partial defense would have given the
139

See Kirkwood, supra note 123, at 63.
Osland, 197 C.L.R at 316, ¶ 108 (McHugh, J.).
141
Id.
142
See generally id.
143
See Scutt, supra note 18, at 116.
144
See Kirkwood, supra note 123, at 60.
145
Osland, 197 C.L.R at 382, ¶ 172 (Kirby, J.).
146
See infra note 213-23 and accompanying text (discussing excessive self-defense,
defensive homicide, and imperfect self-defense doctrines). For a clarification of the
140
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Osland jury another option besides provocation, for which there was
allegedly insufficient evidence of a triggering incident,147 and thus avoided
an all-or-nothing choice between murder and completely exculpatory selfdefense. Unfortunately, this type of middle ground was unavailable in
Heather Osland’s 1996 trial. Her conviction for murder in Victoria
announced that her beliefs and actions qualified for neither exoneration nor
mitigation, whereas James Ramage’s did.148 It was this situation and others
like it that Victoria’s reformers sought to change.
B. MODERN AUSTRALIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD INTIMATE-PARTNER
VIOLENCE

Prior to the 2005 reforms, the law of homicide in Victoria fit poorly
not only with the social context of intimate-partner killings, but also with
community values. Modern Australian society has displayed a growing
awareness “of the prevalence of domestic violence, its seriousness, and that
it is a criminal offence.”149 This development owes much to the tireless
work of feminist reformers, government advertising, and the White Ribbon
Campaign, a self-funded volunteer effort by a national group of men and
women from myriad businesses, workplaces, and organizations.150 Such
moves to educate the general public have met with backlash from men’s
rights groups and others calling for an acknowledgment that women also
engage in intimate-partner violence and criticizing allegedly inflated crime

differences between provocation and imperfect self-defense, see note 317 and accompanying
text.
147
Osland, 197 C.L.R. at 382, ¶ 170 (Kirby, J.) (opining that the trial judge’s reference
to a “specific triggering incident” was correct and not properly objected to at trial).
According to Justice Kirby, “[e]vidence of a long-term abusive relationship, even if
accepted, did not afford a person in the position of the appellant a blank cheque to plan and
execute the homicide of her abuser, protected by the law of provocation, with only a passing
nod at the immediate circumstances said to have driven her to the grave step of participating
in the termination of a human life.” Id.
148
The manslaughter sentence that Ramage received fell well below the statutory
maximum of twenty years, although it was a comparatively severe sentence for provocation
manslaughter in Victoria. See McSherry, supra note 104, at 17. Victoria’s Sentencing
Advisory Council report noted, however, that Ramage’s sentence “was the second highest
sentence for provocation manslaughter” during 1998-2007. PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING,
supra note 10, at 83 & app. at 3 fig.11.
149
Mandy McKenzie, Backlash and Beyond: Shifts in Community Attitudes to Domestic
Violence, 1 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & INCEST RESOURCE Q. 16-22 (2007) (on file with author).
150
Michael Flood, Secrets and Lies: Responding to Attacks on Domestic Violence
Campaigns, AUSTL. DOMESTIC & FAM. VIOLENCE CLEARINGHOUSE NEWSL. 3 (Univ. New.
South Wales), Summer 2006/2007 (describing the White Ribbon Campaign), available at
http://www.austdvclearinghouse.unsw.edu.au/Other_%20publications/Flood.pdf.
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statistics that place blame on men.151 Yet, despite some dissonance, only
one in five Australians believed that a man’s use of physical force against
his wife was justified under any circumstances in 1988.152 And the trend
away from viewing intimate-partner violence as “just a domestic” has
continued to grow.
Part II of this Article showed that the Australian government punished
wife-killers with prison sentences or even the death penalty in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.153 The greatest change in social
attitudes in our own time began with the explicitly feminist women’s refuge
movement of the 1970s and the law-reform efforts of the 1980s, which
included the establishment of task forces in every Australian state and
territory to collect material on the circumstances and experiences of
domestic violence victims.154 These state task forces helped spur the
criminalization of spousal abuse, stalking, marital rape, and the breach of a
protective order.155 Their efforts also led to the modification of search-andseizure laws to give officers greater authority to investigate domestic
violence calls.156 Although three Australian states now appear to be
international trendsetters in abolishing provocation, the United States
served as a model for many of these earlier reforms.157
Battered women’s advocates continue to face challenges in Australia.
Shelters are overcrowded and underfunded;158 the prevalence of plea
bargaining and discretionary sentencing sometimes undercuts doctrinal
reforms;159 and the police and courts only sporadically enforce protective
orders.160 The Australian public has also proved reluctant to discard the
widespread belief that excessive alcohol consumption causes intimate
151

See LESS THAN EQUAL, supra note 10, at 109; Flood, supra note 150, at 3-4;
McKenzie, supra note 149, at 16.
152
See Jane Mugford, Stephen Mugford & Patricia Weiser Easteal, Social Justice, Public
Perceptions, and Spouse Assault in Australia, 16 SOC. JUST. 103, 118 (1989).
153
See supra text accompanying notes 65, 71-72.
154
See Judith Allen, Policing Since 1880: Some Questions of Sex, in POLICING IN
AUSTRALIA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (Mark Finnane ed., 1987) (“[T]he distinctive activity
of contemporary feminists has been the establishment of women’s refuges, rape crisis
centres and young women’s shelters, staffed by feminists, funded by the state.”); Mugford et
al., supra note 152, at 112-13 (describing the work of the domestic violence task forces).
155
See LESS THAN EQUAL, supra note 10, at 115; Mugford et al., supra note 152, at 114.
156
See RENATA ALEXANDER, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AUSTRALIA: THE LEGAL RESPONSE
24, 33-43 (2002) (explaining changes in criminal procedure).
157
See Mugford et al., supra note 152, at 113.
158
Id. at 105-06.
159
See ALEXANDER, supra note 156, at 33, 52; KILLING THE BELOVED, supra note 1, at
148, 173, 182.
160
See LESS THAN EQUAL, supra note 10, at 113; KILLING THE BELOVED, supra note 1, at
77-78, 91.

66

CAROLYN B. RAMSEY

[Vol. 100

violence.161 Nevertheless, an emerging consensus unsympathetic to sexual
rage killings has made the expansive modern provocation doctrine the
flashpoint for reform in several Australian states.
When Victoria abolished the partial defense in 2005, the move was
characterized as an effort to bring the criminal law into line with
community values.162 Public sentiment inflamed by the availability of heatof-passion mitigation in the widely-reported Ramage case163 coincided with
independent efforts by the VLRC to rethink homicide defenses. Communal
outrage at James Ramage’s ability to escape a murder conviction centered
on the way the defense lawyer vilified the dead victim to generate empathy
for the defendant’s loss of self-control.164 The legal outcome may have
been offensive to the public because it represented a mode of thinking about
sexual rage killings that is disfavored; indeed, some evidence indicates that,
at the time of the Ramage trial, Australian courts and juries were already
“becoming more reluctant to accept the partial defense of provocation” in
such cases.165

161

See Renata Alexander, Wife-Battering—An Australian Perspective, 8 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 229, 244 (1993); Mugford et al., supra note 152, at 108.
162
See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text (discussing the groundswell of
community sentiment favoring the abolition of the provocation doctrine in Victoria).
163
See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
164
See Karen Kissane, Honour Killing in the Suburbs, AGE (Austl.), Nov. 6, 2004, at 4-5;
Victoria to Scrap Provocation Defence to Murder, ABC NEWS ONLINE (Austl.), Jan. 20,
2005, available at http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200501/s1285812.htm (noting that
the abolition of the provocation defense in Victoria followed “an outcry by campaigners over
an eleven-year manslaughter sentence handed to a Balwyn businessman who was cleared of
murdering his wife”); see also CLEARY, supra note 104, at 43, 137-38, 162, 170, 176, 179
(criticizing the outcome on grounds similar to those described in the press). The case
became the subject of a popular book by footballer-turned-activist Phil Cleary, whose own
sister had been murdered by a former boyfriend in Melbourne and who had become a
crusader against the provocation defense. See generally CLEARY, supra note 104 (presenting
a somewhat sensational account of the Ramage case); Susanna Lobez, Killer of a Quandary,
SUNDAY SUN HERALD (Austl.), Sept. 22, 2002, at 75 (noting Cleary’s advocacy of the
Victorian reforms and his personal connection to the provocation doctrine arising from the
murder of his sister by a man who subsequently served only three and a half years in prison).
Cleary noted that it was “sad that it had taken a ‘society’ killing [of wealthy Melbournite
Julie Ramage] to strike up a debate about the ‘barbaric’ provocation defence strategy.”
Stuart Walsh & Mairza Fiamengo, Wife Killer Gets 11 Years for Manslaughter: Call for
Change, GEELONG ADVERTISER, Dec. 10, 2004, at 4.
165
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 41 & n.142; see Lobez, supra note
164, at 75 (reporting that, in 2002, Victoria Appeal Court Justice Norman O’Bryan rejected
the appeal of a man who killed his estranged girlfriend for insulting him and declared that
“the defence of provocation had outlived its usefulness”); see also Howe, supra note 63, at
59 (“[I]n some jurisdictions, notably Australia, appeals against murder convictions in wifekilling and homosexual advance killings are not succeeding like they used to.”).
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Public criticism of the Ramage verdict and sentence dovetailed with
academic efforts to expose the social context of intimate-partner homicide
and the gender bias of the criminal law. A growing body of empirical
research suggests that men primarily kill in the intimate context to retain
control over their partners, while women most often use lethal violence
when they fear being killed or injured by a man.166 Tasmania abolished the
partial defense of provocation in 2003, acknowledging this feminist
criticism.167 When the VLRC recommended the same move as part of a
comprehensive reform package, it expressly relied on a paper by law
professor Jenny Morgan as well as other social scientific findings about the
differing reasons that men and women kill.168 The Ramage case did not
affect the VLRC report, which was derived from established research and
printed before the controversial verdict.169 Nevertheless, the case likely
influenced the state parliament’s speedy adoption of the VLRC
recommendations.
The reforms in Victoria and Tasmania in turn sparked reconsideration
of homicide defenses in several other Australian states. Since Victoria
enacted its reforms in 2005, controversial verdicts in intimate homicide
cases have fueled public demands to abolish provocation in other parts of
Australia.170 Law reform commissions or ad hoc bodies in Queensland,
New South Wales, and Western Australia have proposed changes to
homicide defenses, but thus far all except Western Australia have stopped
short of abolishing the provocation doctrine.171 For example, when
166

See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 42, at 23-29 (analyzing various studies); Margo I.
Wilson & Martin Daly, Who Kills Whom in Spouse Killings? On the Exceptional Sex Ratio
of Spousal Homicides in the United States, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 189, 206-09 (1992) (discussing
data on the United States).
167
Rebecca Bradfield, Comment, The Demise of Provocation in Tasmania, 27 CRIM. L.J.
322, 323 (2003) (listing the reasons Tasmania’s Attorney General provided for abolishing
provocation).
168
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 29-30; Morgan, supra note 42, at 2329 However, I will argue that the VLRC proposals went beyond trying to level the gendered
playing field to reframing homicide defenses in terms of moral evaluations of conduct. See
infra notes 180-83, 187-91 and accompanying text.
169
Telephone Conversation with Jenny Morgan, Professor, Melbourne Law School, Mar.
24, 2008; see also CLEARY, supra note 104, at 190 (noting that the VLRC Final Report had
already been printed when the jury delivered its verdict in the Ramage case).
170
See, e.g., Defence Can Blame Victim for a Crime, COURIER-MAIL (Austl.), July 6,
2007, at 26 (reporting that the unsuccessful campaign to abolish provocation in Queensland
“was driven by the mother of 16-year-old Taryn Hunt, who was brutally clubbed to death
with a steering wheel lock by her former boyfriend, 30-year-old Damian Karl Sebo”);
Emmaline Stigwood, Sebo Acquittal Sparks Calls for Law Reform, GOLD COAST BULL., July
4, 2007, at 12 (making a similar report).
171
See LAW REFORM COMM’N OF W. AUSTL., REVIEW OF THE LAW OF HOMICIDE FINAL
REPORT 329 (2007) [hereinafter REVIEW OF THE LAW OF HOMICIDE] (recommending the
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Queensland reassessed its defenses to murder in 2008,172 the Queensland
Law Reform Commission proposed recasting, rather than abolishing, the
provocation defense.173 By contrast, that same year, Western Australia
replaced provocation manslaughter with the new crime of “unlawful assault
causing death,” acknowledging its debt to the VLRC, and also revamped its
self-defense provisions. 174
C. MOVING AWAY FROM PARTIAL EXCUSES: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF VICTORIA’S HOMICIDE LAW REFORM PACKAGE

The precursor to Victoria’s reforms—the abolition of provocation in
Tasmania in 2003—proceeded on relatively impoverished theoretical and
policy foundations. The two most important rationales seem to have been,
first, that the repeal of Tasmania’s mandatory death sentence for murder
made heat-of-passion mitigation in the guilt phase unnecessary and, second,
that the partial defense tacitly endorsed male violence prompted by a man’s

abolition of the provocation defense and changes to self-defense law), available at
http://www.lrc.justice.wa.gov.au/097-FR.html; LENNY ROTH, N.S.W. PARLIAMENT,
PROVOCATION AND SELF-DEFENCE IN INTIMATE PARTNER AND HOMOPHOBIC HOMICIDES 12
(N.S.W. Parliamentary Libr. Res. Serv. Briefing Paper No. 3/07, 2007) [hereinafter NSW
BRIEFING PAPER] (stating that, in 1997, the NSW Law Reform Commission recommended
retaining
but
reformulating
the
provocation
defense),
available
at
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/2283257FD5435499CA
2572C30009E286/$File/provocation&INDEX%20FINAL.pdf. For journalistic discussion of
these reform proposals, see, for example, Amanda Banks, New Defence Planned for Battered
Wives, AUSTRALIAN, May 16, 2006, at 7 (noting that the Western Australian Law Reform
Commission proposed abolishing provocation and introducing a separate defense for
battered women). But cf. Call for Calm on Murder Law, COURIER MAIL (Austl.), July 7,
2007, at 12 (“[Queensland] Attorney-General Kerry Shine has warned against any ‘knee-jerk
reaction’ to abolish the defence of provocation following a controversial manslaughter
case.”).
172
See generally QUEENSL. LAW REFORM COMM’N, A REVIEW OF THE EXCUSE OF
ACCIDENT AND THE DEFENSE OF PROVOCATION (No. 64, 2008) [hereinafter QLRC, A
REVIEW] (reviewing the law of provocation and making reform proposals), available at
http://www.qlrc.qld.gov.au/reports/R%2064.pdf.
173
Id. at 474.
174
Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act, 2008, §§ 8, 12 (W. Austl. Num. Acts No.
29/2008). The superseding provision allows for criminal liability even for unforeseeable
deaths caused by the defendant’s assault. Id. § 12. However, it is unclear that this
substitution will prevent angry men who formerly could have raised successful provocation
claims from being convicted of lesser crimes than murder. For the influence of the VLRC
final report on reforms in Western Australia, see, for example, REVIEW OF THE LAW OF
HOMICIDE, supra note 171, at 276, 280. Changes in self-defense law, including the
introduction of the mitigating doctrine of excessive self-defense in Western Australia, will
be discussed infra notes 201-23 and accompanying text.
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Tasmanian Director of Public
inability to control his spouse.175
Prosecutions Tim Ellis further described the provocation doctrine as
inconsistent “with the expectations of a civilised society.”176 However,
abolition in Tasmania occurred without being explained or theorized in a
law-reform report, and perhaps most importantly, it constituted a standalone measure that struck from the law a partial defense upon which female
as well as male defendants had relied. No evidentiary changes were
introduced to make it easier for battered women charged with murder to
convince the jury that they had acted in self-defense, and no substitute for
provocation was enacted. For some Australian feminists, Tasmania’s
surgical strike raised a grave concern that eliminating the provocation
doctrine would actually “worsen the legal position of battered women who
kill.”177 Nevertheless, the Tasmanian Parliament voted unanimously for the
measure.178
In contrast, the reform package enacted in Victoria emerged from a
long deliberation process in which numerous individuals and groups
enjoyed input and was underpinned by a detailed report that explained the
theoretical and policy grounds for interconnected changes to homicide
defenses. The reforms are often described as embodying a substantive
equality position designed to remediate perceived gender imbalances in the
impact of the law,179 and indeed, these objectives suffused the report. But
scrutiny of the VLRC recommendations discloses an additional theoretical
foundation—chiefly, a moral objection to the existing doctrine’s failure “to
distinguish sufficiently between values and beliefs the law should and
should not tolerate.”180
The report proposed, as a general matter, that partial excuses be taken
into account at sentencing, not in the guilt phase.181 Rather than mitigating
the severity of the conviction based on the defendant’s irrationality or poor
impulse-control, the revised law should assess whether the defendant killed

175

Bradfield, supra note 167, at 324. Reformers in Victoria similarly noted that the
death penalty in that state was abolished in 1975. PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note
10, at 7.
176
Ellen Whinnett, Murder Law to Be Changed, MERCURY (Hobart, Austl.), Sept. 5,
2002, at 9.
177
Bradfield, supra note 167, at 324.
178
Forell, Gender Equality, supra note 93, at 57.
179
Id. at 28, 56; Reg Graycar & Jenny Morgan, Feminist Legal Theory and
Understandings of Equality: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?, 28 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 399, 407 (2006) (discussing the VLRC report).
180
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 34.
181
See id. at xxvii.
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for morally appropriate reasons.182 The VLRC thus drew a moral and legal
line in the guilt phase between killings based on impermissible emotions
like a desire for sexual revenge and those arising, to a large degree, from
self-protection. The emphasis on moral judgment and the disfavoring of
partial excuses represent two of the most important contributions of the
Commission’s work; yet, as I will argue below, the proposals sometimes
strayed from this position in places they ought to have stuck to it.183
1. Shifting Provocation to the Sentencing Phase
The abolition of provocation as a partial defense to murder constituted
the centerpiece of Victoria’s reforms; the state parliament implemented this
VLRC proposal in the Crimes (Homicide) Act of 2005.184 The VLRC
grounded its recommendation in social scientific evidence that men commit
75% of intimate-partner homicides in Australia each year and that many of
these men allege provocation.185 While women accused of murder in
Victoria could successfully raise the partial defense under pre-reform law,
those who did so typically killed in response to fear-inducing sexual or
physical assaults by a domestic partner, rather than loss of self-control
stemming from a partner leaving, threatening to leave, or starting a new
sexual relationship with another person.186 The VLRC critique of this
situation provided a moral assessment of the differing scenarios in which
men and women generally claim to have been provoked: “These two
circumstances, it is suggested, should not be seen as comparable . . . . The
Commission believes the problems with the defense go beyond gender
bias.”187
First, the VLRC evaluated loss of self-control as a partial excuse and
concluded that, short of a completely exculpatory mental impairment, “we
should expect people to control their impulses [no matter] what provocation
is offered.”188 Loss of self-control fails to “provide a sufficient reason,
moral or legal, to distinguish [provoked] killers from cold-blooded

182
The executive summary of the VLRC report announced that “in the twenty-firstcentury, the Victorian community has a right to expect people will control their behaviour,
even when angry or emotionally upset.” Id. at xxi.
183
See infra text accompanying notes 210-12, 218-23, 232-37.
184
Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 3b (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005).
185
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at xxv (citing empirical research
suggesting that female defendants in New South Wales fare better than male defendants
when claiming provocation).
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 27.
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killers.”189 The Commission described this as “one of the most compelling
reasons for abolishing the [provocation] defence.”190 Second, the VLRC
declined to authorize victim-blaming in the context of infidelity, separation,
or divorce, which it characterized as an exercise of “personal rights to leave
a relationship or start a new [one].”191
Abolishing provocation in the guilt phase does not necessarily mean
eliminating it completely. Rather, the VLRC final report recommended that
it be considered, along with other factors, at sentencing.192 Of course,
shifting consideration of provocation claims from trial to sentencing creates
the possibility that defendants will simply receive leniency at a different
stage. This occurred in the American state of Texas, which in 1993
abolished voluntary manslaughter as a separate offense and deferred
consideration of passion claims until sentencing.193 However, in Victoria, a
report under the aegis of the Sentencing Advisory Council (SAC)—an
independent statutory body composed of criminal lawyers, victims’
advocates, academics, and others with experience in the criminal justice
system—attempted to foreclose such a scenario by proposing standards for
limiting provocation-based leniency in punishment determinations.194 The
publication of these recommendations followed the enactment of changes to
homicide defenses. Attorney-General Rob Hulls described the 2008 SAC

189

Id.
Id.
191
Id. at 56.
192
Id. at xxvii. This move included a reallocation of burdens. When provocation was
taken into account in the guilt phase, the prosecutor bore the burden of showing that the
defendant did not act in the heat of passion, whereas in the sentencing phase, the prisoner
must show that he or she was provoked. See PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note 10, at
26.
193
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(d) (2003); see 43 TEX. PRAC., CRIM. PRAC. AND PROC.
§ 31.95 (2d. ed., 2008); David Crump, “Murder, Pennsylvania Style”: Comparing
Traditional Homicide Law to the Statutes of Model Penal Code Jurisdictions, 109 W. VA. L.
REV. 257, 316-17 (2007). A Texas defendant bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that he “caused the death under the immediate influence of
sudden passion arising from an adequate cause,” and, if he succeeds, his offense is reduced
to a second-degree felony carrying a maximum sentence of twenty years. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 12.32-33, 19.02(d) (2003). Yet, in reality, intimate murderers who commit
separation assaults in Texas may only serve a tiny fraction of that range. In 1998, for
example, Jimmy Watkins returned to the family home in Fort Worth and fatally shot his
estranged wife and injured her boyfriend. The jury convicted him of murder but
recommended a probationary sentence because Watkins acted in the sudden heat of passion.
A judge then sentenced the prisoner to a $10,000 fine and ten years’ probation, only four
months of which were to be served in custody. LEE, supra note 14, at 42-43.
194
PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 93. One of the report’s authors,
Professor and SAC Chair Arie Freiberg, clarified in an email that, while the report was
discussed generally by the Council, it was not formally proposed or adopted by it.
190
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report, Provocation in Sentencing, authored by Felicity Stewart and Arie
Freiberg, as “an important resource when courts [begin] the task of
sentencing of offenders convicted of murder rather than manslaughter under
the new law.”195 However, because few cases have come before the courts
yet, the impact of these recommendations remains unclear.
Provocation in Sentencing endorsed the VLRC’s general approach of
examining the reasons the accused killed and making “judgments about the
values and views that drove the accused’s decision to act.”196 According to
the SAC report, provocation should be seen as a justifying doctrine, not as
an excuse for loss of self-control, even at sentencing: “[T]he crucial
question is whether the provocation gave the offender a justifiable sense of
being wronged.”197 Thus, a provocation claim at sentencing should only
mitigate punishment if the defendant had a valid moral basis for feeling
outraged. Some of the old provocation categories, such as assault on a
close relative, would qualify, and some newer ones like fury over a racial
slur might also meet the test.198 However, according to the SAC report,
outrage at an intimate partner’s decision to end the relationship could not be
justified because each partner should be able to make an autonomous choice
to leave. Even if this behavior causes emotional pain, trying to obstruct it
and regain control over the straying spouse is never morally appropriate.199
The SAC report thus insisted that moral judgments be underpinned by an
equality norm; women should be as free as men to terminate a relationship
and not be punished for attempting to do so by men’s greater tendency
toward lethal violence.200
2. Expanding the Doctrine of Self-Defense
The expansion of self-defense constituted a necessary corollary to the
abolition of provocation. Prior to the reforms, Victoria was the only
195

Geoff Wilkinson, No Let Off for Wife Killers: Report Urges Judges to Ignore
Provocation, HERALD SUN (Austl.), Feb. 7, 2008, at 23.
196
PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 93.
197
Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
198
The SAC report recommended:
Conduct of the victim which consists of a single racial taunt, while it is to be deplored, may not
be sufficient in itself to lessen the culpability of an offender . . . . However, the context of the
comment, including whether it included threatening undertones or occurred against a background
of discrimination, is relevant to whether the offenders aggrievement is justified and, along with
the degree of disproportionality between the comment and the offence, is relevant to whether—
and to what degree—the offender’s culpability should be reduced.

Id. at 73.
199
Id.
200
See supra notes 41-42,185 and accompanying text (discussing gender imbalance in
the perpetration of intimate-partner homicides).
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Australian state that relied on common law principles of self-defense, rather
than having a statutory provision, so codification was a threshold goal.201
Then, rather than introducing a separate defense for battered women who
kill their abusers, the VLRC report recommended two steps—reforming
self-defense law to make it more inclusive of women’s experiences and
adopting a partial defense of excessive self-defense to provide mitigation
for defendants who honestly but unreasonably believed in the necessity of
lethal action. In either case, the defendant’s conduct would likely be fearbased, though the existence of anger would not negate the claim unless it
constituted a “premeditated desire for revenge.”202
Perhaps the most significant feature of this self-defense proposal was
its assertion that “[t]here may be circumstances in which the accused’s
belief in the need to take action is reasonably held where the danger is not
immediate, but is inevitable.”203 In other words, action in self-defense
might be necessary when the defendant believed it was “only a matter of
time” before the deceased inflicted death or serious injury and the defendant
lacked an alternate means of self-protection.204 Another notable aspect of
the VLRC proposal involved proportionality, which the pre-reform law in
Victoria did not expressly require. The VLRC declined to impose a strict
proportionality element due to common size-and-strength disparities
between aggressors and those they attack and the fact that women may use
a weapon or choose a non-confrontational moment to strike their abusers in
compensation for such disparities.205
In short, the VLRC recommendations essentially proposed codifying
preemptive strikes as potentially reasonable, depending on the
circumstances, in cases where the deceased posed an ongoing, unlawful
threat of death or serious injury to the accused. This recommendation
proved influential. The self-defense provision enacted statutorily in
Victoria in 2005 tracked the VLRC proposal by omitting any requirements
of proportionality or imminence,206 and the 2008 homicide amendments in
201

VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at xxviii.
Id. at 91.
203
Id. at 80.
204
Id.
205
See id. at 83-84.
206
Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6 (9AC) (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005). Several scholars
have presented convincing arguments against an imminence requirement. See Burke, supra
note 18, at 274, 282-83, 297-98; Richard Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women
Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 410 (1993) (“[I]n appropriate cases the
imminence requirement can be eliminated without undermining the basic fabric of the selfdefense laws.”). Since this Article concentrates on partial defenses, it will not dwell on an
aspect of total exculpation that others have skillfully covered. However, the elimination of
the proportionality requirement is potentially more troubling. How could a violent response
202
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Western Australia expressly allowed self-defense acquittals of defendants
who used deadly force to defend themselves or another person “from a
harmful act, including a harmful act that is not imminent.”207
Past abuse often demonstrates the inappropriateness of the traditional
self-defense elements of imminence and strict proportionality for assessing
reasonableness.
For this reason, Victoria also adopted evidentiary
provisions in family violence cases to clarify what evidence is relevant to
the question of whether the defendant had a reasonable belief in the
necessity of her actions.208 In Victoria, this evidence now encompasses
relationship history, including past violence and social, cultural, and
economic factors affecting the defendant, as well as expert testimony on the
psychological impact and social context of domestic violence.209
However, Victoria did not go far enough toward envisioning a system
in which abuse victims can be defended without psychological experts.
Because BWS evidence will still be used under the reformed law, the risk
remains that judges, expert witnesses, and defense attorneys will continue
to pathologize and stereotype the accused. The BWS theory casts
defendants as dysfunctional and excludes a range of female experience,
including that of aboriginal and other minority women whom researchers
believe are more likely than white women to fight back against violent
partners and whose behavior thus does not fit the paradigm of learned

to an assault or threat be disproportionate and yet still be necessary? There are several
scenarios in which this paradox is easy to resolve. For example, a woman presumably could
shoot an attacker with a gun, even if he were unarmed, if he tried to strangle her. The strict
proportionality of a bare-hands killing would not be required under these circumstances,
especially given a likely disparity in size and strength. She could also use deadly force to
ward off a rape or kidnapping. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1962) (providing that
deadly force can be used to protect against rape or kidnapping); Douglas Husak, Partial
Defenses, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 167, 184 (1998) (“[M]ost jurisdictions allow a
defendant to use deadly force . . . to protect himself against death, serious bodily harm,
kidnapping or forcible sexual intercourse.”). But could she shoot her attacker if he punched
her with his fist? Under traditional self-defense principles, an individual could not kill in
response to a mere punch, and she certainly could not do so if the would-be attacker only
threatened to punch her in the future. The answer for a battered woman should be identical,
unless her experience of domestic violence has taught her that the next blow will be lethal or
unless the relationship in which she is trapped can be analogized to a hostage situation. Cf.
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 92 (suggesting that courts might have a different perspective on
cases of battered women who kill during non-confrontational moments if they saw such
defendants in “the paradigm of hostages resisting their captors”). This makes the
admissibility of past-abuse evidence crucial.
207
Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act, 2008, § 8 (W. Austl. Num. Acts No.
29/2008) (emphasis added).
208
Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6(9AH) (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005).
209
Id.
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helplessness.210 By contrast, factors including prior violence and threats;
unsuccessful attempts to seek help from friends, family, the police, and
other government agencies; the lack of a safe place to go; and financial
constraints can all be framed as traditionally admissible evidence.211
Indeed, such information has been introduced to defend abused women
since the nineteenth century.212 Even if an expert witness is employed, such
testimony should address the social framework, rather than the pathological
aspects of BWS.
While revamping self-defense constitutes an important component of
feminist homicide law reform, Victoria failed to reclaim this exculpatory
doctrine as a justification for battered women charged with murder by
ridding it of the excuse-inflected baggage of BWS. Thus, the state
parliament may have opened the door to allegations that it abolished
mitigation for men who lose control, while expanding psychological
excuses for women.
3. A New Partial Defense for Self-Protective Killings
The adoption of a new mitigating doctrine, short of total exculpation,
constituted the second half of the VLRC’s proposed reform of self-defense.
The Commission recommended that Victoria reintroduce excessive selfdefense “as a ‘halfway house’ for cases where self-defense is not
successful, but where manslaughter is the more appropriate outcome” than
murder.213 Although the Commission envisioned excessive self-defense as
a safety net in family violence cases, it was not to be limited to intimatepartner homicides, but would also extend to other scenarios in which the
defendant used “a level of force that is grossly excessive or otherwise

210

Osland v. R. (1998) 197 C.L.R. 316, 372-73, ¶ 161 (Kirby, J.) (contending that BWS
“is based largely on the experiences of Caucasian women of a particular social background.
Their ‘passive’ responses may be different than those of women with different economic or
ethnic backgrounds”); Note on Hickey: The Problems with a Psychological Approach to
Domestic Violence, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 365 (1993) (arguing the BWS does not fit the
experiences of Aboriginals in Australia); see also HILLARY POTTER, BATTLE CRIES: BLACK
WOMEN AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 115-38 (2008) (presenting qualitative
sociological findings, based on interviews with abuse survivors, about how black women
physically fight back against intimate-partner violence).
211
Joan H. Krause, Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who Kill: A Response to
Professor Dressler, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 555, 566 (2007).
212
See supra notes 83-84, 88 and accompanying text.
213
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 94. Previously, in 1987, the Zecevic
case had eliminated excessive self-defense claims in Victoria. Zecevic v. Dir. of Pub.
Prosecutions (Vict.) (1987) 162 C.L.R. 645, 664 (Wilson, Dawson & Toohey, JJ.)
(criticizing excessive self-defense for being too complicated).
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Practically speaking, the Commission hoped the
unreasonable.”214
existence of a trial outcome between a murder conviction and an acquittal
might encourage more defendants to go to trial, rather than to plead guilty
to charges that did not really fit the circumstances in which they killed.215
In the end, the Parliament of Victoria enacted a new crime called
“defensive homicide” that bears the same penalty as manslaughter—no
statutory minimum sentence and a maximum of twenty years in prison.216
The difference from excessive self-defense seems to be mostly expressive.
Under the provision the parliament enacted, the conviction literally
incorporates the concept of “defense,” which lessens the stigma to those
who honestly sought to protect themselves or their families. Defensive
homicide may also be broader than excessive self-defense. Under the
excessive self-defense statute recently enacted in Western Australia, for
example, a defendant will be convicted of manslaughter if her act would be
treated as self-defense “but for the fact that the act is not a reasonable
response by the person in the circumstances as the person believes them to
be.”217 The focus in Western Australia therefore rests on the excessiveness
of the response, rather than on the defendant’s unreasonable perception that
she was being threatened or attacked. Manslaughter mitigation on these
grounds may apply to a smaller group of cases than under Victoria’s new
law.
Will defensive homicide operate as a partial justification or a partial
excuse in Victoria? The VLRC report described its proposed mitigating
claim as the latter and conceded some inconsistency with its overall
preference for leaving such matters for sentencing.218 Yet these partial

214
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 101. The concept of a grossly
excessive level of force hints that a minimal proportionality requirement has been smuggled
into self-defense, thus satisfying a concern that I raised above. See supra note 206.
215
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at xxix.
216
Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6(9AD) (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005).
217
Criminal Law Amendment (Homicide) Act, 2008, § 8 (W. Austl. Num. Acts No.
29/2008).
218
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 101. Marcia Neave, the chairperson
of the VLRC at the time the final report was drafted, described the provision of a partial
excuse as an exception to the “guiding principle in the report . . . that differences in degrees
of culpability generally should be dealt with through the sentencing process.” Marcia
Neave, Homicide Sentences: Taking Culpability into Account, 86 REFORM 33 (2005) (on file
with author). Imperfect or excessive self-defense doctrines are often depicted as excuses in
the academic literature, as well. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse
Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 336 (1998) (indicating
that imperfect self-defense claims by defendants who honestly but unreasonably believed
they needed to use deadly force operate as partial excuses); cf. George P. Fletcher,
Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 576-78
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defenses could instead be characterized as partial justifications based on
fear of unlawful violence. The latter rationale would preserve the focus on
whether the defendant’s valuation embodied an appropriate moral
judgment. The distinction between acts and beliefs that Cynthia Lee
proposes is helpful here. As Lee argues, even though a defendant’s belief in
the need to use force may be reasonable, her “conduct may not be
reasonable either because the force used was not proportionate to the harm
threatened or because other, less drastic, alternatives were available.”219
The reasonable emotion or belief only partially legitimates the defendant’s
act.
Creating a partial defense for self-protective homicides has much to
recommend it. It is preferable to misguided efforts to retain expansive
versions of the provocation or EMED doctrines to defend battered women
who kill their abusers,220 for such efforts simply create a broader and more
permissive safe haven for angry men than nineteenth-century doctrines ever
did.221 It also has the potential to provide mitigation to defendants who
formerly would have claimed provocation in scenarios other than sexual
rage killings. For example, a defendant who committed homicide when
faced with a non-lethal attack by an aggressor other than an intimate
partner, or who witnessed a family member being victimized by such an
attack, might have killed in honest but objectively unreasonable defense of

(1996) (arguing that a battered woman who kills her sleeping abuser can be excused, but not
justified, because she acted on an instinct of self-preservation).
219
Cynthia K.Y. Lee, The Act-Belief Distinction in Self-Defense Doctrine: A New Dual
Requirement Theory of Justification, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 191, 221 (1998) (emphasis
added); see also LEE, supra note 14, at 269-73; Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 288
(making a distinction between “having the emotion and acting in accordance with it”).
Explaining Victoria’s defensive homicide provision in this manner is more difficult, though,
because it also seems to mitigate claims based on unreasonable beliefs and emotions.
220
According the VLRC final report, “In submissions and during consultations,
particular concern was expressed about the likely consequences of removing provocation as
a safety net for women who kill violent partners, but who are unable to successfully argue
self-defence . . . . There was some support for the abolition of provocation to be delayed
until self-defence could be shown to offer women who kill in response to violence a true
defence.” VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 38-39; see Howe, supra note 63,
at 54 (noting that some feminist groups in Britain urged the British Law Commission to
reform the provocation doctrine, rather than abolish it, because there was no other safety net
for battered women).
221
See supra notes 43-72 and accompanying text (describing strict limits on provocation
mitigation for men in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries). Zealous defense
attorneys will likely seek to cast the homicidal acts of enraged male clients as “defensive
homicide,” and such moves may be successful, but the new defense still limits the
circumstances eligible for mitigation by requiring an honest belief that deadly force was
necessary.
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herself or a close relative.222 Finally, a defensive homicide law allows for
lesser convictions and sentences under appropriate circumstances without
treating either women or men as if their actions arise from a mental
condition.223
4. Other Partial Defenses to Murder
When considering other partial defenses to murder, lawmakers in
Victoria displayed inconsistency in their commitment to curtailing excusebased doctrines. The decision not to introduce a diminished responsibility
defense in Victoria provides evidence that the Commission and the state
parliament, in the main, sought to eschew excuses based on irrationality or
loss of self-control.224 However, the VLRC’s characterization of excessive
self-defense as a partial excuse was not the only instance of deviation from
its core message. The adoption of other homicide defenses, such as duress,
paired with continued reliance on BWS evidence, weakened the reformers’
bid to articulate a coherent theory of criminal responsibility.
i. Diminished Responsibility
“Diminished responsibility,” also known as “partial responsibility,” is
a doctrine used in some European countries and four Australian states that
entitles the defendant to a reduction in the severity of his sentence, even
though the prosecutor has proved all elements of the crime. In Britain and
Australia, the defense reduces murder to manslaughter. In contrast, in the
United States, a different doctrine called “diminished capacity” operates to
negate the required mens rea.225 The diminished or partial responsibility

222

The SAC report reached a similar conclusion, stating:

As a result of the abolition of the partial defence [of provocation], it would be expected that
offenders found guilty of murder under the new law would generally receive more severe
sentences than those previously found guilty of provocation manslaughter. However, not all
people who might previously have been found guilty of provocation manslaughter will
necessarily be convicted of murder under the new law. Some may instead be acquitted after
successfully raising self-defence; others may be found guilty of defensive homicide or unlawful
and dangerous act manslaughter . . . .

PROVOCATION IN SENTENCING, supra note 10, at 31.
223
See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 102.
224
Id. at 232 (“The Commission’s view and final recommendations in relation to
diminished responsibility have been influenced by its views about partial excuses
generally—that is, that there must be compelling reasons for making them available at
all . . . .”).
225
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 393-94 (4th ed. 2006); SANFORD
KADISH, STEPHEN SCHULHOFER & CAROL STEIKER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 910
(8th ed. 2007).
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defense remains controversial in the United States and has only been
adopted in a few states.226
Diminished responsibility can be faulted on the grounds that it will
lead to specious claims and that it fails to hold defendants who are not
legally insane fully accountable for their actions. Moreover, it raises the
specter of increased public danger if it reduces general and specific
deterrence.227 Because it tends to arouse intense popular opposition, it may
also have a corrosive effect on societal respect for the criminal law.228
Beyond this litany of familiar crime-control objections, adding
diminished responsibility to Victoria’s homicide law would have negated
many of the other reforms the VLRC persuaded the state parliament to
adopt. Chiefly, it would have given jealous, controlling spouses a
mitigating claim even after the provocation doctrine was eliminated.229 It
also might have become the default for juries reluctant to exculpate battered
women who killed their abusers, thus perpetuating disease theories of
family violence. As reformers in Western Australia noted in their
comparable critique of this partial defense, “the focus on the psychology of
the victim of domestic violence who kills can obscure the true reason the
victim killed the deceased: the history of domestic violence.”230 Rejecting
the diminished responsibility defense thus constituted a wise step away
from labeling female defendants as mentally impaired. 231
226
DRESSLER, supra note 225, at 394, 399. California abolished the defense in the 1980s,
after it was successfully used to defend Dan White against charges that he murdered San
Francisco Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk. See generally People v.
Saille, 820 P.2d 588 (Cal. 1991) (providing a thorough discussion of the history of the
doctrine in California); see also WILSON, supra note 11, at 125-28 (discussing Dan White’s
successful diminished responsibility claim); Carolyn B. Ramsey, California’s Sexually
Violent Predator Act: The Role of Psychiatrists, Courts, and Medical Determinations in
Confining Sex Offenders, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 469, 497 (1999) (noting the abolition of
diminished capacity or diminished responsibility mitigation in California). Dr. Martin
Blinder, who provided expert testimony about White’s depression and junk-food addiction,
also appeared for the defense in People v. Berry, a California wife-killing case in which
Blinder blamed the deceased’s suicidal tendencies for her strangulation at the hands of her
jealous husband. See People v. Berry, 556 P.2d 777, 780 (Cal. 1976).
227
See Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility
Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 851 (1977).
228
See supra note 226 (discussing the legal fallout from successful diminished
responsibility claim that Dan White raised in California in the 1980s).
229
VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 242.
230
REVIEW OF THE LAW OF HOMICIDE, supra note 171, at 283.
231
The unavailability of a diminished responsibility claim in Victoria is even less likely
to result in unfair punishment than it is in states that have inflexible punishment regimes.
Because Victoria does not impose mandatory minimum sentences, judges may devise
appropriate outcomes, including hospitalization, for individuals whose mental deficiencies
arguably reduce their culpability. VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 242.
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ii. Duress
The VLRC also succeeded in convincing the Parliament of Victoria to
adopt duress and necessity as defenses to murder and manslaughter in
Victoria232—a move inconsistent with its general emphasis on eliminating
partial excuses from the guilt phase. Citing a South Australian case, Regina
v. Runjanjic and Kontinnen, the Commission recommended allowing the
jury to hear BWS evidence on a duress claim.233 It thus revealed its
reluctance to abandon the language of excuse or cut ties with psychological
interpretations. Indeed, some Australian scholars associate Runjanjic and
Kontinnen, the first case in which BWS was admitted in an Australian trial,
with impoverished constructions of the theory that almost exclusively
emphasize abnormal mental state at the expense of social context.234
The duress test seems to have been conceived as an objective one,
centered on a reasonable choice between evils, rather than as a sympathetic
concession to irrationality. BWS evidence presumably would go to the
reasonableness of the defendant’s choice.235 Yet duress poses issues that
are inherently more troubling than either perfect or excessive self-defense
because it applies to the killing of innocent third parties. It is not limited to
sympathetic scenarios of battered women who failed to protect minor
children from death or sexual abuse, but also extends to active crimes. Its
applicability to battered women’s cases in the absence of an imminence
requirement thus means that defendants might claim duress as a defense to
multiple crimes that occurred over years of ongoing domestic violence.236
The VLRC never veered closer to “whatever works” pragmatism than
it did in its willingness to excuse women who facilitate their batterers’
crimes and to allow BWS testimony to accomplish that end.237 The moral

232

Crimes (Homicide) Act, 2005, § 6(9AG) (Duress) (Vict. Acts No. 77/2005). The
majority of American jurisdictions do not recognize the defense of duress in cases of
criminal homicide. See Larry Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1488 (1999). Only the Model Penal Code and a small
number of jurisdictions permit this theory to excuse all crimes. See id. at 1488 (citing
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1)). While a full discussion of duress lies beyond the scope of
this paper, which primarily focuses on the provocation doctrine, I would not favor a dramatic
expansion of the duress defense in the United States.
233
See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 121, 123-24 (citing R. v.
Runjanjic & Kontinnen (1991) 53 A. Crim. R. 362).
234
See Stubbs & Tolmie, Falling Short, supra note 1, at 722-23.
235
See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra note 3, at 123.
236
See Burke, supra note 18, at 311-13.
237
Astoundingly, the VLRC also indicated support for the continued operation of the
archaic marital coercion defense in Victoria. See VLRC, DEFENCES TO HOMICIDE, supra
note 3, at 122. Although it declined to make any formal recommendations as to this
doctrine, which does not apply to murder in Victoria, it gratuitously opined:
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gulf between killing a brutal abuser and victimizing a third party may
simply be too wide to bridge. Falling back on the BWS approach in its zeal
to include every possible defense for battered women accused of criminal
homicide, the Commission failed to adhere consistently to a moral stance.
5. Some Concluding Thoughts on Victoria’s Homicide Law Reforms
Victoria’s homicide law reforms could have been reconciled in a
manner that not only achieved substantive gender equality, but also
consistently made moral judgments about a defendant’s acts and valuations
that distinguished less wrongful homicides from more wrongful ones based
on the defendant’s reasons for killing. Victoria’s failure to steer the latter
course without swerving leaves its reform package vulnerable to the
criticism that it excuses women, while abolishing mitigation in the guilt
phase for the types of homicides that men more often commit—in other
words, that it turns the tables without achieving justice. The changes to
murder defenses in Victoria were carefully conceived and have much to
recommend them. However, they would have provided a more coherent
agenda with broader applicability to other jurisdictions if they had
uniformly demanded that murder defendants be treated as responsible moral
agents in cases falling short of insanity.
Taking a consistently evaluative approach would have made more
visible the connection between Victoria’s reforms and the purposes of the
criminal law. For example, if a murder conviction sends the message that it
is wrongful to deny your spouse the autonomous choice to leave the
marriage, at least three goals can be served. First, the condemnatory
message itself fulfills the criminal law’s expressive function. Second,
consistent expression of moral condemnation may stigmatize this type of
killing and thus have a deterrent effect on potential offenders who
internalize the norm. Lastly, the conviction sends a strong cue about desert.
If we believe the sexual rage killer is more deserving of punishment than
Retention of the defence [for other crimes] may be justified because of the high rate of violence
by men against their partners and the difficulties which women experience in seeking effective
protection against such violence. The Commission acknowledges that some women who are
subjected to psychological and physical abuse may be forced to commit crimes by their
husbands, although we note that it is anomalous that the defence currently applies only to
married women and not to women in de facto relationships.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Anne Coughlin has thoroughly documented how in the nineteenth-century United
States, the marital coercion defense was associated with theories of married women’s total
submission to their husbands’ will, as well as with their feeblemindedness. See Coughlin,
supra note 18, at 28-42. The VLRC’s embrace of this defense hints at an instrumental desire
to achieve the acquittal of battered women at any cost, even at the expense of stereotyping
women as childlike and dysfunctional. This is a troubling passage.
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the defendant who honestly but unreasonably killed in self-defense, we
must follow the courage of our convictions in treating sexual rage as an
inappropriate valuation and acknowledging that fear caused by spousal
battering
is
an
appropriate one.
IV. MORAL JUDGMENT, PARTIAL DEFENSES TO MURDER, AND THE
PROSPECTS FOR REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
This Part considers whether Victoria’s reform package should be
adopted in American states and concludes that several steps ought to be
taken with regard to partial defenses. First, statutory EMED defenses based
on the Model Penal Code should be repealed. The second step depends on
the willingness of state legislatures to revise their sentencing regimes.
Victoria's reforms exemplify the greater creativity that can be brought to
improving substantive law when guided discretion is possible in sentencing.
American sentencing law is currently in flux. Some states have repealed
mandatory minimums and lowered maximum penalties for certain crimes
due to budgetary concerns and other factors.238 Enhanced ability to
individualize sentences for murder would make possible the complete
abolition of the common law provocation doctrine in the guilt phase. By
contrast, if American states retain their harsh sentencing structures, the
common law provocation doctrine will have to be curtailed, rather than
abolished completely. Constraints on its availability could take the form of
either refashioned categories of adequate provocation or categorical
exclusions of certain types of defense claims, such as those based on a
spouse’s infidelity, separation, or desire for a divorce. This Part contends
that, because it is difficult to anticipate every conceivable wrong that might
lead a defendant to feel morally appropriate anger, it is preferable to list the
things that cannot constitute the basis of a provocation claim. Finally,
widespread adoption of an imperfect self-defense doctrine without any
requirement of an immediate threat would provide an important safety net
for defendants who claim to have killed to protect themselves, but whom
juries are unwilling to exonerate completely.
A. THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA: A COMPARISON OF THE
MODERN SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT

238
See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1276, 1285-90 (2005).
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Although American women may commit intimate-partner homicides
more frequently than their Australian counterparts,239 recent data
demonstrate that both fatal and non-fatal intimate-partner violence in the
United States primarily involves female victims and male perpetrators.240
According to U.S. Department of Justice surveys, American men are three
times more likely than American women to kill their spouses or intimate
partners.241 Moreover, women in the United States, as in Australia, usually
commit intimate-partner homicides “after years of suffering physical
violence, after they have exhausted all available sources of assistance, when
they feel trapped, and because they fear for their own lives.” In contrast,
American “[m]en often hunt down and kill spouses who have left them.”242
While some husband-killers are vilified at trial,243 modern American
cases, like their historical counterparts,244 tell a complicated and somewhat
surprising story. According to a recent study, rage killers are more likely to
be convicted of murder than to receive manslaughter mitigation, whereas
prosecutors and juries tend to accept the EMED claims of defendants who
assert that they committed homicide out of fear.245 Anecdotal evidence
indicates that the female defendants who have attracted the least sympathy
from juries and the media engaged in conduct that resembled a separation
assault by a jealous male.246 Such examples might suggest that calls to
239
See Morgan, supra note 42, at 2 n.5 (citing Wilson & Daly, supra 166, at 190 (“In the
United States, ‘the number of women who kill their husbands relative to the numbers of men
who kill their wives . . . is exceptionally high.’”)).
240
See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE 1993-2001 (2003).
241
Id.
242
Wilson & Daly, supra note 166, at 206.
243
See, e.g., LEE, supra note 14, at 49-50 (arguing that Betty Broderick, a Southern
California woman who killed her ex-husband and his new wife, failed to fit the image of the
Reasonable Woman because, after the divorce, she gained weight, stalked her former spouse,
damaged his property, and left vulgar messages on his answering machine).
244
See supra Part II.
245
Stuart M. Kirschner, Thomas R. Litwack & Gary J. Galperin, The Defense of Extreme
Emotional Disturbance: A Qualitative Analysis of Cases in New York County, 10 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 102, 102, 127 (2004).
246
One such case that produced a media frenzy involved the so-called “Mercedes
Murderer,” Clara Harris, who ran over her adulterous husband three times with her luxury
car while his teenaged daughter sat, horrified, in the front seat. See Prosecution Witnesses
Feb.
12,
2003,
Recall
Wife
Running
Over
Husband,
CNN.COM,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/02/11/harris.trial/; see also LEE, supra note 14, at 46-50
(discussing the case of Betty Broderick, who committed a lethal separation assault on her
former spouse and his new wife). Both Broderick and Harris were convicted of murder. See
id. at 49 (noting that Broderick was convicted of second-degree murder); Nick Madigan,
Jury Gives 20-Year Term in Murder of Husband, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2003, at A15
(reporting that a jury convicted Harris of first-degree murder).
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abolish or amend the provocation doctrine and the EMED defense are
premature and that the impact of these laws on men’s and women’s cases is
not, in fact, unfair. Conversely, they could be interpreted as a sign that
some individual actors in the criminal justice system have a truer compass
than does the current law—that is, they apply expansive doctrines narrowly
with an eye to the moral difference between jealous rage and frustration, on
the one hand, and fear of physical victimization, on the other.
Some positive legal change has already occurred in the United States.
As discussed below, a few American jurisdictions, most notably Maryland
and Minnesota, have revised their laws to constrain the ability of domestic
abusers and sexual rage killers to escape murder convictions.247 In addition
to these changes, some states have laws that parallel specific aspects of
Victoria’s reform package. For example, a substantial minority of
American jurisdictions allow imperfect self-defense claims to reduce
murder to manslaughter in a manner similar to Victoria’s new defensive
homicide provision.248 Feminists in the United States have also taken the
lead in identifying less stigmatic means of explaining a battered woman’s
constrained or non-existent choices than the BWS theory provides.249
Nevertheless, the laws in some American states still make BWS
evidence a necessary evil to get an imperfect self-defense theory, not to
mention completely exculpatory claims, before a jury.250 Reforming
defenses to murder thus constitutes a prerequisite to eschewing stereotypes
of irrationality when representing battered women who killed their abusers,
as well as to ridding homicide law of its morally erroneous excuses for
men.
B. ABOLISHING THE EXTREME MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL
DISTURBANCE APPROACH

The repeal of EMED statutes is an important place to start. The chief
dangers of the Model Penal Code approach described earlier in this Article
are its extreme individualization of the “reasonable person” test and its
247

See infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text.
See Reid Griffith Fontaine, Reactive Cognition, Reactive Emotion: Toward a More
Psychologically-Informed Understanding of Reactive Homicide, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 243, 259 (2008).
249
Indeed, as early as 1996, a study undertaken under the federal Violence against
Women Act, recommended a social-context approach. It described the breadth of empirical
knowledge about “battering and its effects” and discussed the limitations of the BWS theory.
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE VALIDITY AND USE OF
EVIDENCE CONCERNING BATTERING AND ITS EFFECTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: REPORT
RESPONDING TO SECTION 40507 OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT vii, xii-xiii (1996).
250
See, e.g., infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text (discussing imperfect selfdefense doctrine in Maryland).
248
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willingness to abandon or cloak moral assessments in favor of sympathy for
a defendant’s purported volitional impairment.251 Defendants who claim
EMED are not legally insane, and they do not argue that their disturbed
emotions negated their intent to kill. Theirs are intentional homicides that
should result in verdicts expressing a high level of condemnation.
Mitigation on the basis of fine psychological gradations that cannot be
reliably determined risks providing a normatively undesirable excuse for
the very defendants this Article contends should not be excused—stressed
or depressed men driven to kill by rage at their inability to control
women.252
Although this Article primarily focuses on culpability, utilitarian
concerns are also relevant. Assuming for the sake of argument that an
emotionally disturbed defendant cannot be specifically deterred due to a
volitional impairment, denouncing his act as murder may prevent others
from raising spurious psychological claims. Furthermore, while the Model
Penal Code approach seeks a halfway house for disturbed individuals who
cannot obtain insanity acquittals, it does not ensure that their reduced prison
sentences will be paired with any therapeutic regimen to help them manage
their violent emotions upon release. Thus, a variety of utilitarian concerns
for society’s safety, including deterrence and incapacitation, can be paired
with arguments about blameworthiness to advocate the repeal of the EMED
defense.
The Model Penal Code’s approach to manslaughter mitigation has had
limited influence in the United States. Relatively few states that adopted
other Code provisions enacted the EMED defense, and “a substantial
number of the ones that did reverted to the common law formulation after
only a short time.”253 However, more than a dozen states currently have
manslaughter laws that partly track Model Penal Code recommendations.254
251

See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
But see Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 289, 301 (2003) (arguing that conditions like “great stress” should reduce
culpability) [hereinafter Morse, Diminished Rationality]. Morse formerly opposed both
heat-of-passion and partial responsibility defenses because he believed that even people with
mental health problems could refrain from killing. See generally Stephen J. Morse,
Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1984)
[hereinafter Morse, Undiminished Confusion]. For further discussion of Morse’s opposition
to the provocation defense, see Morse, Diminished Rationality, supra, at 290, and infra note
269 and accompanying text.
253
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 323.
254
One prominent criminal law casebook asserts that five states “adopted the Model
Penal Code provocation proposals almost whole (Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Kentucky,
and New York)” and that “[a]bout a dozen other states adopted some of the Code’s features,
usually the ‘extreme emotional disturbance’ formulation, but adopted it with significant
alterations.” KADISH ET AL., supra note 225, at 405. In contrast, Lee contends that “at least
252
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Others have judicially expanded versions of the common law provocation
defense. The empirical evidence that Victoria Nourse compiled clearly
shows that, in reform jurisdictions, judges give more manslaughter
instructions in separation-murder cases than in common law states.255
Many of these killings arise, not from witnessed acts of adultery, but from
the victim’s choice to leave her partner, file for divorce, get a restraining
order, or decline a request for a date. The law permits the defendant’s claim
of control over a spouse, lover, or even the object of his unrequited sexual
obsession to extend far beyond the termination of all social and legal
connection. During the period Nourse studied, men who stalked and killed
women because they remarried, moved out, or simply declined to become
romantically involved routinely succeeded in getting their emotional
disturbance defenses before a jury.256 Heterosexual intimate partnerships
are not the only gendered situations in which the EMED approach
acknowledges intense emotions bordering on depravity as potential objects
of a jury’s compassion. For example, heterosexual men have asked juries
to believe they acted under provocation or EMED when they killed gay
men for making non-violent sexual overtures to them.257
What the jury does with such claims may be a different matter.
Although Nourse did not analyze verdicts, at least one study has shown that
between 1988 and 1997 in New York County, a jurisdiction that follows the
Model Penal Code approach, juries and prosecutors made distinctions
favoring defendants who “killed or tried to kill in response to physical
victimization or understandable fear [thereof]” at the hands of the deceased,
but proved “unreceptive to claims of EED [the New York version of
EMED] when the defendant’s prevailing emotion at the time of the crime
was anger unmitigated by a reasonable . . . fear of physical harm.”258 Thus,
contrary to some feminist predictions,259 increased jury discretion does not
seem to have resulted in rampant sexism in verdicts mitigating murder to
voluntary manslaughter. The New York study’s authors conclude that the
concerns of EED critics are “considerably exaggerated” and that, in fact, the

twenty states have adopted the Model Penal Code approach to provocation” and provides a
helpful list in a footnote. LEE, supra note 14, at 33 & n.66.
255
See Nourse, supra note 17, at 1347-50 & tbls.A & B.
256
See id. at 1352-66.
257
Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 500 (2008)
[hereinafter Lee, Gay Panic].
258
Kirschner et al., supra note 245, at 130.
259
See, e.g., Emily L. Miller, Comment, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter,
Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665, 669 (2001) (expressing concern that
the EMED doctrine will allow jurors to give voice to their own prejudices).
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defense may be most compassionate toward battered women who kill their
abusers.260
Three objections to this conclusion must be noted, however. First, the
authors do not actually demonstrate that the defense works well for female
defendants, as a very small number of subjects in their study were
female.261 Second, the New York data does not allow meaningful analysis
of “gay panic” claims, which have resulted in manslaughter mitigation in
several cases.262 Third, “successful” outcomes for murder defendants, as
measured by manslaughter verdicts and acquittals, tell only a partial story—
the story of the jury’s compassion for one type of defendant over another.
They do not tell us that the law on the books is fair or expressive of
appropriate judgments about which beliefs and actions reflect
blameworthiness or dangerousness. “[T]he decision to send the case to a
jury itself has legal meaning,” as Nourse contends.263 When an EMED
instruction communicates to a jury that anger over an intimate-partner’s
departure reduces murder to manslaughter, “it partially, but clearly,
punishes the act of leaving” the relationship.264 Thus, it sends a bad moral
message, and it reduces deterrence, too, by showing leniency to rage killers
whom little or no empirical evidence suggests are less likely to recidivate
than others who commit homicide.265 Furthermore, even if some juries
interpret the elements of EMED more narrowly than the instructions

260
Kirschner et al., supra note 245, at 126, 129. I have found anecdotal evidence that
defense lawyers sometimes advise male clients to plead guilty to murder in exchange for a
reduced sentence, rather than to claim EMED, in separation assault cases and that these
decisions have been held not to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel because juries
may be unlikely to accept EMED claims and may even recommend a death sentence on
separation-assault facts. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 258 S.W.3d 435, 440 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that defense counsel was not ineffective in pursuing a guilty plea, rather
than raising an EMED defense, where the defendant shot his estranged wife in front of
eyewitnesses after she ended their relationship and obtained an emergency protective order
against him); Perez v. Warden, No. CV000597510, 2001 WL 1468643, at *8 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Nov. 2, 2001) (holding that defense counsel did not perform ineffectively by
recommending that a physically abusive, alcoholic husband who killed his unfaithful wife
enter a guilty plea, rather than proceeding to trial with an EMED claim).
261
Only two cases involved female defendants, both of whom pled guilty to
manslaughter without a jury determination of whether self-defense or any other claim might
have exculpated them completely. See Kirschner et al., supra note 245, at 108.
262
See Lee, Gay Panic, supra note 257, at 500; cf. NSW BRIEFING PAPER, supra note
171, at 11-12 (discussing Green, in which a man who killed in response to a non-violent
homosexual advance was found guilty of manslaughter after the Australian High Court
overturned his murder conviction).
263
Nourse, supra note 17, at 1357.
264
Id. at 1355, 1357.
265
Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 31, at 965.
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encourage,266 the potential for ambiguous and arbitrary application of the
partial defense bolsters the case for its abolition.
A few feminist scholars—most notably, Nourse and Donna Coker—
have mounted criticisms of expansive, modern approaches to loss of selfcontrol.267 Yet, for other feminists, the parallels between the longer time
frames and psychiatric experts needed to show EMED and those used to
raise self-defense claims based on BWS have led to a pragmatic reluctance
to attack EMED too strenuously. In the end, though, it is a mistake to
concede any commonality between a man who slays his partner because he
cannot control her sexuality (or her other non-violent behavior) and a
woman who kills her husband because he threatens her with death.
Legislatures ought to insist on a moral distinction between the two and
repeal the EMED statutes. As described below,268 widespread adoption of
imperfect self-defense mitigation—or defensive homicide, as Victoria’s law
now describes it—would provide a back-up option more appropriately
tailored to self-protective killings than EMED.
C. THE FATE OF THE PROVOCATION DOCTRINE

1. Is Abolition Feasible in the United States?
A few American scholars have urged complete abolition of the heat-ofpassion defense, including its narrower common law incarnations. For
example, Stephen Morse makes the compelling argument that
[r]easonable people do not kill no matter how much they are provoked, and even
enraged people generally retain the capacity to control homicidal or any other kind of
aggressive or antisocial desires. We cheapen both life and our conception of
responsibility by maintaining the provocation/passion mitigation . . . . As virtually
every human being knows because we all have been enraged, it is easy not to kill,
269
even when one is enraged.

The abolition argument has also been made from a feminist perspective in
the United States. Emily Miller contends, for instance, that “[b]ecause what
is reasonable cannot be determined without reference to value systems
biased in favor of men, the only true egalitarian approach is abolition.”270
But the abolitionist position has not gained ground in the United States the
way it has in Australia. Although Texas shifted consideration of “sudden
266
See, e.g., People v. Ross, 826 N.Y.S.2d 769, 772 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (“[A]nger
and jealousy do not entitle a defendant to an extreme emotional disturbance charge.”)
267
See Coker, supra note 117, at 78, 82, 86-87, 91-92, 120; Nourse, supra note 17, at
1337, 1352-58, 1365-66.
268
See infra notes 317-33 and accompanying text.
269
Morse, Undiminished Confusion, supra note 252, at 33-34 (footnote omitted).
270
Miller, supra note 259, at 693.
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heat of passion” from the guilt phase to the penalty phase, it did so without
attacking the gendered impact of designating separation or infidelity as
legally provoking.271 Moreover, no ripple effect ensued from the Texas
reform.
The drastic reduction of judicial authority over criminal sentencing in
the 1980s and 1990s partially accounts for the abolition argument’s lack of
success in the United States. During this time period, mandatory minimum
sentencing laws, life-without-parole penalties, repeat offender provisions,
and strict guidelines regimes proliferated at the state level, and the majority
of states abolished or limited parole.272 Eliminating a mitigating doctrine
like the heat-of-passion defense in this environment would have subjected a
larger class of murder defendants to draconian and virtually automatic
penalties. Recently, the innocence movement, budgetary concerns, and
other factors have created a climate more favorable to sentencing reform.
Both the number of executions and support for the death penalty have
declined, and more than half of American states have taken strides to make
sentencing less harsh and more individualized.273 The time thus may be
ripe for a comprehensive overhaul of our approach to murder cases that
includes the reform of defenses, as well as changes to the way we sentence
and punish those convicted of murder or manslaughter.
Yet, unlike Victoria and Tasmania, which can defer consideration of
provocation arguments to a flexible sentencing phase, many jurisdictions,
including Britain and some Australian and American states, still allow
minimal discretion in sentencing.274 In Western Australia, the provocation
defense was abolished even though the presumptive penalty for murder was
life imprisonment. However, Western Australia paired reform of the
substantive law with at least one change in its sentencing regime; it now
allows a penalty reduction for circumstances in which a life term would be
unjust.275 By contrast, in jurisdictions where discretionary leniency in
sentencing is proscribed, a murder verdict dictates much more than the
stigma of conviction.

271

See supra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative change in
Texas).
272
See James Forman, Jr., Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Helped Make
the War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 331, 360-61 (2009).
273
See id. at 369-70 & n.199; Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86
TEX. L. REV. 223, 267 n.214 (2007).
274
Jeremy Horder qualified his call for abolition in Britain with the caveat that such a
move would only be possible “should the mandatory life sentence for murder ever be
abolished.” HORDER, supra note 35, at 197. See also Forell, supra note 38, at 43 (discussing
the impact of mandatory minimum sentencing on the reform of murder defenses).
275
CRIM. CODE 1913 (W. Austl.), § 279(4).
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Some commentators might not find this harsh result troubling,
especially in cases of defendants whose homicidal acts arose from sexual
jealousy. Indeed, the SAC report in Victoria recommended excluding such
claims from mitigation at sentencing.276 But the provocation doctrine has
never been solely about adultery or the termination of intimate
relationships. Rather, the partial defense traditionally embodied other
claims besides the iconic allegation of victim infidelity—including claims
based on the accused witnessing the deceased assault a family member or
experiencing a violent attack by the deceased himself.277 While anecdotal
evidence yields glimpses of popular outrage over lenient sentences for men
who slew their adulterous wives,278 totally abolishing the provocation
doctrine in the United States, without concurrent changes to our draconian
sentencing structure, would deprive other provoked defendants of a chance
for mitigation.279
For these and other reasons, American scholars have largely confined
themselves to modifying the “reasonable person” test280 or to discussing
how a jury should be instructed to counter potential prejudices.281 We need

276

See supra notes 194-200 and accompanying text (discussing the SAC report’s
recommendations).
277
See, e.g., Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718 (Md. 1991) (describing the traditional
common law categories of legally adequate provocation).
278
See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 346.
279
See Forell, supra note 38, at 43.
280
For instance, Caroline Forell and Donna Matthews propose a “reasonable woman”
standard that would result in the categorical exclusion of any alleged provocation “short of
actual or imminent serious bodily harm.” FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 14, at 172. This
creative proposal can be faulted for assuming all women see reasonableness the same way.
Although I accept empirical evidence that women most often kill in self-defense, whereas
men kill out of a desire to exert control, my argument does not ultimately depend on
essentialist generalizations about women’s emotions or beliefs. It is more useful to describe
the moral content the law should embody and the norms it should announce than to
characterize these aspirations as masculine or feminine. My approach celebrates and
reinforces changes in societal attitudes, such as emerging intolerance for sexual rage killings,
without suggesting that the only “good guys” are the ones who think like women. Homicide
law should respect non-violent acts of autonomy in an intimate relationship, rather than
display empathy for one partner’s brutal desire to dominate the other; it should express
compassion and even approval for defensive conduct in response to physical victimization.
In short, I agree with much that Forell and Matthews advocate, including their claims that
“reasonable women want and demand respect, personal autonomy, agency, and bodily
integrity” and that behavior violating these aspects of humanity should be illegal and
punishable. Id. at xix. However, in the final analysis, I believe the “reasonable woman”
standard is marred by its tendency to stereotype and essentialize female experience.
281
For example, Cynthia Lee advocates jury instructions that insert a proportionality
requirement by explaining that the defendant’s act, as well as his emotion, must be
normatively reasonable. LEE, supra note 14, at 268. She also proposes helping jurors
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to go farther than this to correct the unequal and morally mistaken impact of
the expansive modern provocation defense. Ideally, this Article will spark a
conversation about the need for comprehensive reform of both substantive
law and sentencing in murder cases. Yet, because American sentencing
regimes are now in flux, it offers a proposal that will work even if
mandatory minimums and other constraints remain on the books in some
states.
2. Refashioning the Categories of Adequate (or Inadequate) Provocation
Alternatives to abolishing the heat-of-passion doctrine include the
retention of the reasonable person standard paired with either the reform of
the traditional common law categories of adequate provocation or the
preclusion as a matter of law of certain types of claims. This Article favors
the latter.
i. Newfangled Categories
Refashioning the categories of adequate provocation might mean a
return to the nineteenth-century five—extreme assault and battery upon the
defendant, mutual combat, the defendant’s illegal arrest, and injury or
serious abuse of a close relative—minus the sudden discovery of a spouse’s
adultery.282 Alternatively, it might necessitate envisioning entirely new
types of victim behavior that could conceivably spark legitimate feelings of
anger or fear. Whichever categories one chooses, though, this approach has
the same flaw that prompted the Model Penal Code reforms—namely, its
inflexibility. The EMED defense can be faulted for replacing righteous
rage with pathology and rigid categories with the potential for nearly
boundless excuses. Nevertheless, the Model Penal Code’s drafters had a
valid point about rigidity. Eschewing the Code’s focus on loss of selfcontrol in favor of moral evaluation provides no method of foreseeing every
wrong that could lead a defendant to feel morally appropriate rage or fear.
A reductive list of provoking conduct thus constrains the provocation
doctrine without offering much assurance that the chosen categories are
either principled or sufficiently inclusive.
ii. Categorical Exclusions
Several American states have instead opted for categorical exclusions,
which I believe to be a superior approach. For instance, Maryland’s
recognize their own biases by asking them to switch certain attributes of the victim and
defendant, including their sex and race. Id. at 252-53.
282
See, e.g., Girouard, 583 A.2d at 718 (describing traditional limits to legally adequate
provocation).
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criminal code now provides that “the discovery of one’s spouse engaged in
sexual intercourse with another does not constitute legally adequate
provocation for the purpose of mitigating a killing from the crime of murder
to voluntary manslaughter even though the killing was provoked by that
discovery.”283 Minnesota bars a defendant from claiming that a child crying
constitutes provocation.284 In a similar vein, several commentators have
urged legislatures to enact laws, or judges to make rulings, that exclude
“gay panic” defenses from manslaughter mitigation.285
The existence of mandatory life terms and other constraints on
sentencing discretion in some states makes it unfeasible to condemn all
provoked killings as murder in these jurisdictions but still allow for some
individualization in punishment. Hence, this Article proposes a solution
that will work with or without sentencing reform. Instead of abolishing the
heat-of-passion defense, American states should statutorily exclude
narrowly drawn classes of victim behavior from legally adequate
provocation on the grounds that killing in these contexts can never be
partially justified.286 My goal is not to draft a model statute, but simply to
propose that killings based on antiquated social values and those that deny
equality between people should be ineligible for manslaughter mitigation.
Although this Article leaves the details of a legislative solution to the
states, categorical exclusions from the standard of legally adequate
provocation might encompass such behavior as:

283

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-207(b) (LexisNexis 2002).
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(1) (West 2009).
285
See, e.g., Scott D. McCoy, Note, The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crimes
Statutes: Their Interaction and Conflict, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 629, 662 (2001) (“[S]tate
legislatures should move to explicitly and statutorily prohibit the homosexual-advance
defense as a part of their hate crimes legislation.”); Robert B. Mison, Comment,
Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80
CAL. L. REV. 133, 176-77 (1992) (“[W]hen a defendant raises the homosexual-advance
defense, judges should consider the growing normative acceptance and understanding of
homosexuality . . . and find as a matter of law that a homosexual advance is insufficient
provocation.”). For examples of proposed and enacted legislative preclusions in Australia,
see infra note 298 and accompanying text (discussing amendments to the provocation
defense in the Australian Capital Territory) and NSW BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 171, at 16
(noting that, in 1998, the exclusion of non-violent homosexual advances from the law of
provocation was recommended in New South Wales). But see Joshua Dressler, When
“Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual
Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726, 763
(1995) (“[I]f critics wish to attack the provocation defense, they should do it from a feminist,
not a sexual orientation, perspective.”).
286
For further discussion of the provocation defense as a partial justification, see infra
Part IV.C.3.
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(1) a decision by the victim to terminate or decline to begin a romantic
or sexual relationship with the defendant or to have sex with another
person;
(2) a non-violent homosexual advance by the victim toward the
defendant;
(3) any behavior by a child, except for an aggressive act that posed a
risk of death or serious bodily injury to the defendant or another;
(4) and mere words.
Precluding these types of defense claims would constrain the provocation
doctrine within bounds sufficiently flexible to accommodate jury
consideration of many individual cases, while still exempting from
mitigation lethal acts arising from indefensible judgments about the
victim’s autonomy, freedom to speak, or youthful misconduct.
Scholars and legislators will likely quibble with these suggested
preclusions. For example, some might find the infidelity-or-separation
exclusion unpalatable, despite the commonplace nature of adultery and
divorce in American society. Marriages consecrated in religious settings
are viewed as sacred; even secular unions often involve vows of fidelity and
permanence. However, being angry or distraught over the disintegration of
a marriage is not the same as violently denying your spouse’s autonomy to
make a choice, even a hurtful choice. The criminal law has no proper role
in assigning fault for divorce, separation, or adultery—especially given
potential ambiguity about whether a spouse wrongfully breached her vows
or whether she was driven into another relationship to escape a cruel and
violent marriage. The criminal law should not use its expressive power to
say that the emotions and actions of dominance in an intimate relationship
make the perpetrator of a lethal separation assault less culpable than a
murderer.287
Barring provocation claims arising from infidelity and separation—
scenarios in which men disproportionately use lethal violence to control and
punish their spouses—is necessary if categorical exclusions are to be
guided by equality principles. A similar approach has been adopted in
Maryland288 and most recently in Britain.289 It has also been proposed in
287

Mahoney, supra note 1, at 65 (defining a “separation assault” as an “attack on the
woman’s body and volition in which her partner seeks to prevent her from leaving, retaliate
for separation, or force her to return. It aims at overbearing her will as to where and with
whom she will live, and coercing her in order to enforce connection in a relationship.”).
288
See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
289
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 that recently became law in the United Kingdom
asserts that sexual infidelity cannot constitute the sole basis for feeling “seriously wronged”
for the purposes of a partial defense of “loss of control.” See Coroners and Justice Act,
2009, c. 25, Part 2, Ch. 1, § 55(6)(c). While this change was under consideration as a bill,
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Queensland, Australia, where a law reform commission recommended
barring provocation claims based on “the deceased’s exercise of choice
about a[n] [intimate] relationship” except in “circumstances of an extreme
and exceptional character.”290
The “mere words” exclusion is perhaps the hardest to reconcile with
substantive equality theory. Indeed, reformers in Victoria indicated that a
racial slur might be sufficiently wrongful to constitute legal provocation for
sentencing purposes.291 However, they made this determination in the
context of provocation’s total elimination as a mitigating doctrine in the
guilt phase. A killer who acts on the basis of a racial slur is still deemed a
murderer in Victoria. By contrast, if the heat-of-passion defense is retained
as an avenue to manslaughter mitigation, I would favor categorically
excluding claims of purely verbal provocation, even if based on race,
ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexual orientation, unless the allegedly
provoking words constituted a threat or were paired with a physical assault.
In “mere words” cases, the equality-denying potential of speech bumps up
against another concern that should inform legislative exclusions—that of
freeing the provocation doctrine from the troubling implications of using
violence to defend honor.292 Words can enforce the subordination of certain
groups and show deplorable prejudice, but the violent, private policing of
hate speech should not be condoned, lest we adopt the pernicious methods
of nineteenth-century honor culture to attack the hierarchical inequities that
honor culture perpetuated. 293

the British government stated that, in a mixed-motive case, “where sexual infidelity is one
part in a set of circumstances which led to the defendant losing control, the defense should
succeed or fail on the basis of those circumstances disregarding the element of sexual
infidelity.” MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER AND INFANTICIDE: PROPOSALS
FOR REFORM OF THE LAW (SUMMARY OF RESPONSES AND GOVERNMENT POSITION) (2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov.uk/
consultations/docs/murder-review-response.pdf. For more information on reforms in the
United Kingdom, see infra notes 308-12 and accompanying text.
290
For the recommendation of the Queensland Law Reform Commission (QLRC), see
QLRC, A REVIEW, supra note 172, at 481. The QLRC proposal seems to give the judge, not
the legislature, gate-keeping responsibility, however.
291
See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
292
In the nineteenth century, provocation claims were not only available to men who
caught their wives in the act of adultery (a classic transgression of honor), but also, as the
doctrine expanded in some jurisdictions, to killers provoked solely by verbal insults. See
supra note 57 and accompanying text. Perhaps more surprisingly, women could defend their
honor by slaying men who jilted them, and when they did so, they often received total
exculpation, rather than being convicted of manslaughter. See supra note 82 and
accompanying text.
293
See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights, and the (First)
Criminal Procedure Revolution, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. ISSUES (forthcoming 2009) (describing
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iii. Responding to Criticisms of the “Categorical Exclusion” Model
Even the basic concept of categorical exclusions is not without its
flaws. Legislative choices about what cannot meet the standard as a matter
of law arguably still confront the task of imagining “the myriad ways in
which an encounter preceding an allegedly provoked killing may take
place.”294 Since a legislature must work on the basis of hypothetical
examples, its ex ante determinations may not fit the facts of actual cases.
Hence, some commentators oppose giving the legislature line-drawing
authority in this area.295 Statutory exceptions to the provocation defense
need not be sweeping, however. For instance, an exception that bars
provocation claims based solely on an intimate partner’s infidelity or
decision to terminate a relationship with the defendant, seek a divorce, or
obtain a restraining order would not preclude a killer’s partial defense to
murdering his adulterous wife if she had also physically abused their
children.
An actual homicide for which manslaughter mitigation was extended
further demonstrates the “categorical exclusion” model’s ability to account
for case-specific facts. In this deadly incident, the male defendant, whom a
camp counselor had repeatedly sodomized when he was a child, killed a
man who made sexual advances toward in him in a park.296 A legislative
ban on provocation claims arising from non-violent homosexual overtures
would not have prevented this killer from raising a mitigating argument
because he also claimed “he thought that he saw the victim reach into his
pocket for a weapon.”297 Such a narrow preclusion of gay panic claims
would harmonize with the approach taken in several Australian
jurisdictions, including the Australian Capital Territory, whose amended
law provides that “a non-violent sexual advance . . . toward the accused is
not sufficient, by itself” to reduce murder to manslaughter.298
A second objection to the “categorical exclusion” model centers on a
preference for juries. For example, Cynthia Lee disfavors both legislative
restrictions and decisions by a potentially prejudiced judge affecting which
provocation issues reach the jury.299 Her criticism of legislative solutions
how the violent honor culture of the nineteenth-century South was used to subordinate
blacks and others who insulted white men).
294
Lee, Gay Panic, supra note 257, at 550.
295
See, e.g., id.
296
Kirschner et al., supra note 245, at 118.
297
Id.
298
NSW BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 171, at 23 (citing Crimes Act, 1900 (ACT), § 13, as
amended by the Sexuality Discrimination Legislation Amendment Act, 2004 (ACT))
(emphasis added).
299
Id.
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presumes that juries are freer from bias than legislatures are because
constitutionally mandated rules of jury composition ensure broad
community representation and because most juries operate unanimously,
rather than following a majority vote.300 I respectfully disagree with her
analysis here. This Article occasionally cites jury verdicts as indicators of
prevalent social values; yet it does not view jury behavior in murder cases
as a transparent window on what types of homicides the law should or
should not punish and with what degree of severity. While the law should
track communal values sufficiently to maintain legitimacy, it should also
play a leadership role in shaping social norms and educating the public
about what is morally wrongful. Legislatures and judges (and to a certain
extent, legal academics) take responsibility for this educative aspect of
lawmaking. Although the latter two display the most pretensions to
enlightenment, it is the former—the legislature—that has the greater
potential to counter minoritarian bias. Moreover, while a jury’s decision to
accept or reject a particular version of the provocation defense may have an
irreparable and largely invisible impact in individual cases, legislative
enactments are not only highly public; they can also be repealed.
Multicultural concerns constitute a third possible objection to the
“categorical exclusion” model. In Victoria and Tasmania, cultural
background is now taken into account in determining punishment, rather
than guilt, in murder cases. This shift in authority from jury to judge has
not been universally applauded because it shunts the discussion of what is
considered provoking in the defendant’s culture to a less visible and less
democratic forum.301
In American states, my proposed legislative
exclusions might clash with some cultural practices even though they would
be established democratically. For example, immigrant and aboriginal
defendants sometimes proffer evidence that, due to their beliefs and
customs, they could not restrain themselves from committing homicide
upon learning of a spouse’s adultery or even her intent to seek a divorce.302
A statutory bar to provocation mitigation in cases of infidelity or separation
arguably would discriminate against the cultural values of these minorities.
The tension between acknowledging cultural difference and
appropriately condemning violence against women troubles many
feminists, including myself.303 Yet, from a formal equality perspective,
concerns about the unequal treatment of minority defendants would be
300

See Lee, Gay Panic, supra note 257, at 553-54.
See, e.g., Bronitt, supra note 113, at 126 (raising such concerns).
302
See LEE, supra note 14, at 113-17.
303
See Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and
Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV.
36, 38-39 (1995) (noting that this tension has produced debate).
301

2010]

PROVOKING CHANGE

97

lessened if neither minorities nor members of the dominant culture could
raise a provocation defense based on infidelity or separation. Even under
the substantive equality approach this Article advocates, neither the white
nor the minority defendant should be allowed to shelter under an
anachronistic and sexist category. Whether the judgment that a wife’s
transgression excused her murder derives from a dominant or minority
claim, it erroneously assumes a static value system unchanged by women’s
international bid for equality over the last century. Euro-Americans and
Euro-Australians have grown more accepting of a wife’s right to leave a
marital relationship. Patriarchal beliefs have also become outmoded or at
least subject to challenge in the homelands of many immigrant and
indigenous defendants of color.304 In short, cultural defense theories should
not be allowed to bolster residual misogyny in the face of progressive social
change.
A fourth anticipated criticism of the “categorical exclusion” approach
is the practical concern that, if the exclusions do not track areas of virtual
unanimity in social values, jury nullification will result. Legislatures that
fail to pair reform of the partial defense with changes in harsh sentencing
laws might encounter a variation on the “sticky norms” problem.305 Despite
the relatively progressive social values revealed by studies of jury verdicts,
residual beliefs that adultery, for example, sometimes warrants a violent
response might lead to acquittal by fact-finders or even down-charging by
prosecutors reluctant to leave defendants with no avenue to mercy.
Categorical exclusions thus might backfire by forcing juries to acquit the
very defendants whom many feminists believe should be labeled as
murderers.
This is a salient criticism and one that is not easy to answer. However,
when legislatures have reformed the provocation doctrine in the recent past,
such changes have been responsive to public criticism of leniency toward
defendants perceived to lack any valid justification for killing their victims.
For example, furor over the 1994 case of Keith Peacock, who received a
sentence of just eighteen months in a work-release program for shooting his
unfaithful wife, prompted Maryland’s legislative exclusion of adultery from

304

See LEE, supra note 14, at 103, 105. By contrast, if a fact situation were not governed
by a categorical exclusion (if it were a killing in response to extreme assault and battery, for
example), cultural evidence could be admissible at the judge’s discretion.
305
Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000) (“[A sticky norms] problem occurs when the prevalence
of a social norm makes decisionmakers reluctant to carry out a law intended to change that
norm.”). In contrast, according to Kahan, “[w]hen the law embodies a relatively mild degree
of condemnation, the desire of most decisionmakers to discharge their civic duties will
override their reluctance to enforce a law that attacks a widespread social norm.” Id.
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the concept of legally adequate provocation.306 And, as this Article
described above,307 the enactment of Victoria’s reform package coincided
with widespread disapproval of mitigation in the Ramage case.
Legislatures should not redraft defenses to murder every time citizens
become incensed over news coverage of a criminal case; however, if public
preferences harmonize with legislative changes, such changes are less likely
to be nullified in the jury room.
3. Provocation as Partial Justification
Constrained within newly tightened boundaries, a provocation claim
should operate as a partial justification. The approach suggested in this
Article does not assert that the killing itself was justified, but rather that it
was prompted by a legitimate, morally defensible valuation that comported
with evolving social norms and substantive equality principles. If the
reintroduction of justifiable emotion is combined with a cooling-time limit
and a required loss of self-control, the reformed doctrine might arguably be
described as a hybrid that retains an element of excuse: the defendant’s
sudden emotion, although justified, overpowered his ability to desist from
an unlawful killing. Deliberate revenge should not be tolerated, and
lawmakers may wish to require a “hot blood” element to exclude such cases
from manslaughter mitigation. Nevertheless, the emphasis should fall on
whether the defendant’s emotions and beliefs can be justified, not primarily
on his alleged loss of self-control.
Bringing back justification reverses the widely accepted, modern
understanding of the provocation doctrine by reasserting a normative
component; yet it has some advocates, including reformist lawmakers in the
United Kingdom. The British Parliament recently enacted a law308 that
abolishes the common law provocation doctrine and adopts and clarifies the
British Law Commission’s 2004 recommendation of a hybrid defense
emphasizing the defendant’s “justifiable sense of being seriously wronged,”
as well as allowing for mitigation when the accused acted “in response to a
Scholars criticized the British Law
fear of serious violence.”309
Commission for failing to consider gender asymmetries and for leaving the
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Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 6, at 346 (discussing the impact of the Peacock case).
For a discussion of the legislative change in Maryland excluding infidelity from legally
adequate provocation, see supra note 283 and accompanying text.
307
See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
308
Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, Part 2, Ch. 1, § 54-56.
309
Graeme Coss, Provocative Reforms: A Comparative Critique, 30 CRIM. L.J. 138, 139
(2006) (emphasis added).
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door open to trivially provoked men.310 Responding to such concerns, the
Coroners and Justice Act of 2009 contains a provision establishing the
insufficiency of sexual infidelity as a basis for feeling “seriously wronged.”
Under the reformed law, infidelity is not to be construed as a qualifying
trigger.311 Unfortunately, the Coroners and Justice Act retains the
possibility that mere words—things “done or said (or both)”—might rise to
that level.312 Despite their shortcomings, however, the British reforms
wisely seek to make the provocation defense unavailable to individuals
whose outrage is idiosyncratic and morally indefensible under
contemporary standards.
American legal scholar Susan Rozelle recently offered another
perspective on provocation-as-partial-justification. She argues that the
doctrine should be applied narrowly to cases where the law supports some
level of violent response to the victim’s conduct. Her proposal differs from
imperfect self-defense in that it covers situations in which the accused had a
lawful right to employ some level of force, regardless of whether he
sincerely feared death or serious harm from the victim. The fact that the
force used was excessive makes her proposal a partial defense.313
Rozelle and I agree that the provocation doctrine retained remnants of
justification long after the tide toward excusing passion killers swept away
the official honor-killing rationale. Indeed, as she notes, even the Model
Penal Code’s quasi-objective prong reveals a minimal concern not to extend
mitigation to defendants whose beliefs and emotions lie beyond what
society is capable of understanding.314 Yet, while I agree with some of
Rozelle’s premises, she and I part company in our approach to reform. She
310

See id. at 139-43 (complaining that the British Law Commission indicated “there may
be cases” in which mere words “could legitimately make the other party feel severely
wronged”); Howe, supra note 63, at 55-56 (criticizing the British Law Commission
proposals for finding that sexual taunts might constitute adequate provocation).
311
Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, Part 2, Ch. 1, § 55(6)(c). The act also applies
“if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to D’s fear of serious violence from V against D
or another person.” Id. § 55(3).
312
Id. § 55(4) (emphasis added).
313
Susan D. Rozelle, Controlling Passion: Adultery and the Provocation Defense, 37
RUTGERS L.J. 197, 229-33 (2005). Rozelle’s proposal is in many respects superior to
Nourse’s warranted excuse, which restricts voluntary manslaughter mitigation to cases in
which the deceased behaved in an illegal manner, see Nourse, Passion’s Progress, supra
note 17, at 1390-93, but fails to recognize that adultery remains a criminal offense under
some state codes. See Dressler, Why Keep the Provocation Defense?, supra note 31, at 981.
314
Rozelle, supra note 313, at 209. However, I disagree with Rozelle’s contention that
the EMED defense requires society to agree that “the defendant somehow was wronged or
aggrieved.” Id. Code-influenced statutes typically contain no elements related to provoking
conduct or triggering events; the touchstone is mental trauma, not justifiable rage. See, e.g.,
State v. Elliot, 411 A.2d 3 (Conn. 1979).
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merely redefines the boundaries of the old common law categories. In
contrast, I believe it would be preferable to create a few exceptions to the
provocation doctrine for completely unjustifiable valuations, as lawmakers
in the United Kingdom and some American states have done, than to return
to a narrow typology of qualifying behavior. The end result might look
fairly similar, based on a shared assumption that legal provocation generally
should involve physical harm. However, unlike Rozelle’s,315 my proposal
does not completely negate the possibility that some nonphysical injury
might qualify.
D. IMPERFECT SELF-DEFENSE

One of the chief contributions of the reforms in Victoria and Western
Australia was the insight that homicide defenses ought to be revamped in a
comprehensive manner—the reform package, rather than the surgical strike.
In this spirit, American reformers should not abolish the EMED approach
or radically limit the provocation doctrine without addressing the need for
changes in perfect and imperfect self-defense. I generally support the
rational actor model of perfect self-defense that Alafair Burke has proposed,
the two key components of which are the repudiation of the imminence
requirement and the criticism of BWS evidence.316 Because this Article
focuses on mitigation, rather than exculpation, however, I will turn to the
topic of imperfect self-defense with the caveat that reforms in these related
areas should be undertaken together.
If American states retain the heat-of-passion defense in a form that
includes fear as well as rage, one might question why the widespread
adoption of imperfect self-defense should be necessary. The answer is that
the two partial defenses are distinct; they serve different purposes and
involve different levels of objective analysis. The provocation doctrine
requires heightened emotion—a rubric that today includes fear and terror,
as well as rage, in most jurisdictions. Yet, whereas fear might arise from
some non-lethal provocations, a defendant claiming imperfect self-defense
must have believed that deadly force was necessary for self-protection or
the protection of others in the face of mortal danger.317 Furthermore, unlike
the passion killer, a defendant who receives mitigation under an imperfect
self-defense theory should not be required to have killed immediately after

315
Rozelle tends to conflate imperfect self-defense and provocation by arguing that “act
justification” would only exist under her revised provocation doctrine if the facts fit the
imperfect self-defense paradigm. Rozelle, supra note 313, at 229.
316
See Burke, supra note 18, at 218-19.
317
Cf. Swann v. United States, 648 A.2d 928, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (making a similar
distinction).
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being harmed or threatened. In other words, the latter theory should not
have a cooling-time limitation.
Although a substantial minority of American states currently recognize
imperfect self-defense, the majority do not.318 As the Supreme Court of
Washington explained, “[n]arrow statutory definitions of manslaughter
have made adoption of imperfect self-defense difficult in some states.”319
In states that already recognize the mitigating doctrine, three versions exist.
The first applies to defendants who initiated a confrontation by using nonlethal violence. The second version, which is similar to Western Australia’s
new law, covers individuals who use excessive force against an aggressor.
Finally, like the Parliament of Victoria, some American legislatures and
courts have acknowledged the partial defense in cases where the accused
honestly but unreasonably believed that the victim posed a threat of death
or serious bodily injury.320 Several American states that adopted the first
two variations insist that the defendant’s belief in the necessity of using
force to defend herself must have been both honest and reasonable.321
Finally, some courts impose additional limits that affect battered
women’s defense cases. For example, in Maryland, imperfect self-defense
claims without supporting BWS evidence are ineligible for manslaughter
mitigation when the facts involve a non-confrontational killing.322 In State
v. Peterson, the appellate court described a trial judge’s decision not to give
an imperfect self-defense instruction as “correct” in a case involving a
woman who “endured twenty-seven years of extreme physical and
318

See Fontaine, supra note 248, at 259; see also State v. Hughes, 721 P.2d 902, 910
(Wash. 1986) (declining to adopt imperfect self-defense in Washington); Note, Battered by
Men, Bruised by Injustice: The Plight of Women Who Fight Back and the Need for a
Battered Women Defense in West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1139, 1186-87 n.298 (2008)
(noting the lack of an imperfect self-defense doctrine in West Virginia).
319
Hughes, 721 P.2d at 909. If the manslaughter statute restricts the actor’s mental state
to recklessness or criminal negligence, an intentional homicide committed in a flawed effort
to save oneself cannot qualify. Id. Legislative changes to manslaughter definitions thus
constitute a prerequisite to the adoption of imperfect self-defense in such jurisdictions.
320
See State v. Faulkner, 483 A.2d 759, 763 (Md. 1984). For a discussion of Victoria’s
adoption of a defensive homicide provision, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 285 S.E.2d 804, 807-08 (N.C. 1982) (quoting State v.
Norris, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572-73 (N.C. 1981)); State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019, 1029 (Utah 2002).
Wisconsin imposes a three-part test that allows the defendant’s conviction for imperfect selfdefense manslaughter “if the jury finds: (1) the defendant had a reasonable belief that he was
preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his person; AND (2) the defendant
had an actual, but unreasonable belief that force was necessary to prevent or terminate the
unlawful interference; OR (3) the defendant had a reasonable belief that force was necessary
to prevent or terminate the unlawful interference but the defendant’s actual belief regarding
the amount of force necessary was unreasonable.” State v. Camacho, 501 N.W.2d 380, 383
(Wis. 1993).
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State v. Peterson, 857 A.3d 1132, 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004).
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psychological abuse” by her husband and then shot him while he watched
television.323 Despite Maryland’s adoption of the “honest but unreasonable
belief” approach,324 imminence and necessity still seem to be required. The
defendant’s unreasonableness may inhere only in the excessiveness of the
force used: “[T]he imperfect self-defense instruction should not be given
unless the evidence generates the issue of whether, under the circumstances,
the defendant was entitled to take some action against the victim.”325
Barbara Peterson, who was sentenced to life in prison for murder, obtained
postconviction relief only because the court deemed her attorney’s failure to
present expert testimony on BWS “ineffective assistance of counsel” in
violation of the Sixth Amendment.326
Peterson is the kind of case that battered women’s advocates cite to
show the continuing need for syndrome evidence;327 yet the real problem
lies in the retention of the imminence requirement. While the imminence
requirement may distort the analysis of perfect self-defense, it surely has no
place when the outcome sought is only mitigation, not exoneration. Critics
of the “reasonable belief” approach to imperfect self-defense argue that the
culpability of a defendant who sincerely thought she faced a threat of
inevitable death or serious harm from the man she shot cannot be equated
with the culpability of “one who intentionally murders another without such

323

Id. at 1145, 1154. This proceeding involved the state’s unsuccessful appeal of a new
trial order based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1135.
324
Faulkner, 483 A.2d at 768-69.
325
Peterson v. State, 643 A.2d 520, 522 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994). Barbara Ann
Peterson subsequently was granted a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel, but
this statement of Maryland law remains undisturbed.
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Peterson, 857 A.2d at 1154.
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The Maryland courts’ insistence on BWS evidence to show the honesty of a
defendant’s belief rejected the power of past-abuse facts to tell the story unaided by
testimony on “learned helplessness”—a form of post-traumatic stress disorder that may
poorly fit the defendant’s situation. To bolster the unsuccessful insanity claim that was
actually raised at Barbara Ann Peterson’s trial, a psychiatrist testified that Barbara suffered
bi-polar and dissociative disorders. The judges demanded a BWS theory to support her
imperfect self-defense argument, and nowhere in any of the opinions was an image of the
defendant as a rational moral actor allowed to emerge. Barbara Ann Peterson may have had
mental problems; her children described her as a “moody and mercurial” religious fanatic
who claimed to see ghosts and experience extra-sensory perception. Id. at 1138 (quoting the
defense psychiatrist’s testimony about statements the defendant’s children had made). But
like many other battered women, she had temporarily left her marital home and sought court
protection from her husband’s brutality so many times that one judge told her not to come
back for a year. Id. In her mind, she had reached the end of her options. Yet, the courts’
focus on her supposed psychosis deflected attention from the ills that most demand a cure—
the failure to prevent intimate-partner homicide by providing a social and legal safety net for
battered women and the continued existence of homicide doctrines that apportion blame and
excuse in undesirable ways.
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a belief . . . . [T]here is or . . . there ought to be, a difference in punishment
between these two types of people.”328 This statement is generally sound,
but we must refine which aspects of the defendant’s belief can be
unreasonable. If the defendant reasonably feared her violent husband, but
was wrong about when he would attack or with how much brutality, she
should get an imperfect self-defense instruction. There, her beliefs and
emotions contained a modicum of reasonableness, even if her lethal act did
not. Contra Peterson, I believe that this showing could be made through the
lens of social framework and past-abuse evidence without the need for a
psychological expert. However, if the defendant’s fear was completely
delusional, and she could not present any evidence that her husband had
ever inflicted serious physical harm on her or threatened her with such
injury, she should not get the instruction. The latter type of claim sounds
closer to diminished responsibility, which I have already rejected.329
This Article has expressed approval for an intermediate option
between the extremes of murder liability and acquittal. I have argued that
imperfect self-defense is a more appropriate backup claim than provocation
for battered women who killed their abusers because it explicitly
acknowledges not only their fear, but also their honest belief in the
necessity of using lethal force. However, to shift partial defenses to murder
away from excuses for unjustifiable valuations, we ought to demand a
modicum of reasonableness and moral appropriateness in the defendant’s
emotion or belief, even in cases of imperfect self-defense. This is important
because imperfect self-defense potentially applies to fact situations far
removed from those of sympathetic battered women.
For example, in Utah, a white supremacist prisoner fatally stabbed a
fellow inmate, who was black, when the latter was in handcuffs and unable
to protect himself. The defendant-appellant, Troy Kell, claimed the trial
court should have given a jury instruction on imperfect self-defense
manslaughter because he had overheard the victim making threats.330
Whether this case should have gone to a jury is a close call. Some Utah
Supreme Court justices voted to affirm the denial of the lesser-includedoffense instruction; others wanted to hold that it was harmless error due to
lack of corroborating evidence.331 Regardless, the case provides a
compelling reminder that feminist criminal law reform affects not only
broader concerns about the position of women in society, but also the moral
328
State v. Camacho, 501 N.W.2d 380, 390 (Wis. 1993) (Bablitch, J., dissenting) (going
against an opinion holding that, in Wisconsin, imperfect self-defense requires a reasonable
belief in the necessity of lethal force).
329
See supra notes 225-31 and accompanying text.
330
State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019, 1025, 1029 (Utah 2002).
331
Id. at 1029 n.5.
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coherence (or incoherence) of homicide law in cases unconnected to
intimate-partner killings. If we demand a minimum amount of rationality
and moral judgment from Kell, as the Utah Supreme Court did, we should
ask the same of women who killed their intimate partners.
The partial defense I propose would be limited to homicides arising
from self-protection or protection of others and would exclude completely
delusional behavior. Vera Bergelson has explained imperfect self-defense
as a partial justification:
If you try to kill me, you violate your duty to me, and thus lose moral parity with me.
That loss of moral parity reduces your right to inviolability and allows me to disregard
it to the extent necessary to protect my right to life. That is a case of complete
justification. Overstepping these boundaries in cases of imperfect self-defense (either
by exceeding the level of force reasonably necessary for the defense or by not
following other requirements of a valid exercise of self-defense) . . . results only in
332
partial justification of the perpetrator.

This understanding of imperfect self-defense reinforces the moral
distinction between killing a person whom one perceives to pose a lethal
threat and ending the life of someone who has caused only emotional
wounds, frustration, or even no harm at all. It also frees the doctrine from
its associations with pathology and dysfunction, which restores the criminal
law’s interests in assessing personal accountability.
V. CONCLUSION
The reform of homicide law only addresses the problem of intimatepartner violence where other solutions have failed. For this reason, it is a
depressing enterprise. As a society, we need to develop a social safety net
so women can leave violent relationships and remain safe from
retaliation.333 We should also emphasize anger management and other
values of non-violence, so that there is less need for condemnatory
convictions and long prison terms to reinforce the message that becoming
enraged at one’s partner, or anyone else, generally provides no license to
batter or kill, except in cases of justifiable, defensive acts. Indeed, criminal
law solutions may not offer the best approach to intimate-partner violence
before it escalates to homicide. That said, intimate-partner violence exists
332
Vera Bergelson, Victims and Perpetrators: An Argument for Comparative Liability in
Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 385, 472-73 (2005).
333
Empirical evidence suggests a strong link between the increased availability of
resources for battered women and a decline in intimate-partner homicides perpetrated by
females. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN
THE U.S., 1976-2005, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/homicide/intimates.cfm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2010) (showing a 75% decline in the number of men killed by female intimates
since 1976).
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on a continuum from non-lethal bullying and relatively minor physical
assaults to fatal shootings, stabbings, and other killings.334 The objection
that the heavy hand of the criminal justice system creates problems at one
end of this continuum335 does not refute the need to reform homicide law so
that it makes appropriate judgments at the other end.
Within the past few years, three Australian states—Tasmania, Victoria,
and, most recently, Western Australia—took bold strides to transform
defenses to murder to redress gender bias. The common thread in their
divergent approaches was the abolition of provocation as a mitigating
doctrine in the guilt phase. The reform effort on which this Article has
focused—the comprehensive package adopted in Victoria—also sought to
locate its restructuring in a bid for greater moral coherence in homicide law.
Victoria’s reformers rejected the provocation doctrine both because it
justifies unjustifiable acts of anger and dominance and because it excuses
and stereotypes men as collectively prone to lethal rage. The VLRC also
made a frustratingly inconsistent attempt to emphasize relationship history
and social-context evidence, in lieu of the BWS theory, and hence to depict
battered women as rational moral actors engaged in justifiable responses to
physical victimization.
While the reforms in Victoria should inspire American lawmakers to
overhaul their own system, such changes must be preceded by a more
complete understanding of what ails murder defenses and how they have
come to be even more indulgent of male violence and less connected to
social norms than they were in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
In countries whose law derives from the English model, the history of
exculpation and mitigation in murder cases has been one of a gradual
default to psychological excuses. Female defendants’ cases have long
involved a strand of compassion for the supposed irrationality of the socalled weaker sex; yet, in the nineteenth and even the early twentieth
centuries, the law of provocation and self-defense was still tied to moral
condemnation of violence against women. As paternalistic solicitude for
women faded and psychological interpretations of human behavior came
into vogue, the criminal law’s emphasis on excusing irrationality became
more pronounced. The narrative of the wronged woman was almost
completely eclipsed by the narrative of the female defendant as helpless,
334

Much has been written about how these apparently diverse types of conduct are
connected in patterns of coercive control. For an early version of the “coercive control”
thesis, see Stark, supra note 39, at 976.
335
See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 825-26 (2007)
(suggesting that “feminists stop advocating for and supporting criminalization” of domestic
violence because, in Gruber’s view, punitive prosecutorial approaches deny the agency of
female victims and discriminate against racial minorities).
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frenzied, and incapable of assessing her options, which is now embodied in
diminished responsibility, insanity, and BWS-based self-defense claims.
Similarly, the narrow doctrine of provocation has expanded dramatically to
include myriad subjective traits of the accused, and in the United States, a
substantial minority of jurisdictions have completely abandoned the
traditional emphasis on killings triggered by wrongful victim behavior.
Scholars began criticizing “abuse excuses” toward the end of the last
century, but they often did so in anti-feminist ways, and most importantly,
few recognized that the expansive, modern provocation and EMED
doctrines were among the worst culprits. This Article has reframed the
critique of partial excuses for murder to acknowledge the gendered patterns
of why men and women kill. In undertaking this project, I have drawn
heavily on the thoughtful and creative efforts of Australian reformers. In
the final analysis, however, I do not recommend that American states adopt
a carbon copy of Victoria’s reforms. First, both the proposed and adopted
legislative changes in Victoria were inconsistent in their commitment to
emphasizing equality-based principles of moral wrongfulness, as opposed
to expanding psychologically based partial excuses. Second, while this
Article will be most successful if it prompts discussion of how murder
defenses and penalties can be simultaneously reformed, the unsettled state
of American sentencing law makes it advisable to draft a proposal that has
the potential to succeed whether or not the recent countertrend toward
greater sentencing discretion continues.
This Article recommends three changes to partial defenses to murder
in the United States that would anchor manslaughter mitigation to moral
evaluation of the defendant’s reasons for killing: the repeal of statutes
influenced by the Model Penal Code’s extreme emotional disturbance
defense, the curtailment of the provocation doctrine through legislative
preclusions, and the widespread adoption of imperfect self-defense as a
mitigating claim in cases where the defendant’s fear of physical
victimization at the hands of the person she killed was more reasonable and
justifiable than her homicidal act. My recommendations would help ensure
that the criminal law provides substantively equal treatment to women, as
victims and defendants in murder cases, while reasserting their capacity for
rational conduct and insisting that both sexes be held accountable for
morally wrongful homicides.
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APPENDIX
INTIMATE-PARTNER MURDER CASES IN COLONIAL NEW SOUTH
WALES, 1824-1840
25 intimate murder cases sampled
4 female defendants: 2 acquitted, 2 convicted of manslaughter
21 male defendants: 11 convicted of murder, 5 convicted of manslaughter, 5 acquitted
Defendant
Name
Bradney

1824

Minton

1824

Bates
Bennett
Chapman
Claig
Butler
Radley

1825
1825
1825
1825
1826
1826

Hartland
Miller

1828
1828

D’s V’s
Charge
Sex Sex
F
M
Petty treason
murder*
F
M
Aid/abet
murder
(petty treason)
M
F
Murder
M
F
Murder
M
F
Murder
M
F
Murder
M
F
Murder
F
M
Petty treason
murder
M
F
Murder
M
F
Murder

Hughes
Venables

1829
1829

M
M

F
F

Murder
Murder

Manslaughter
Manslaughter

Byrne
1833
Dickenson
1833
Farrel
1834
McCormack 1834
Smith
1834

M
M
M
M
F

F
F
F
F
M

Murder
Murder
Murder
Murder
Murder

Guilty
Acquitted
Acquitted
Guilty
Manslaughter

Bowles
James

M
M

F
F

Murder
Murder

Guilty
Guilty

Year

1835
1836

Verdict

Sentence

Acquitted
Acquitted

Guilty
Acquitted
Manslaughter
Acquitted
Guilty
Manslaughter
Manslaughter
Guilty

Executed
2 years
Death
Unclear
2 months
Death (commuted to
transportation for life)
6 months
Transportation for 7
years
Executed

Executed
Transportation for 7
years
Executed
Death (later freed)

*
Petty treason murder was “the murder of a husband by a wife, or a master by servant, or
of a religious superior by one owing obedience.” If a woman were convicted of this crime,
the court would order her to be burned to death. Petty treason was abolished in England by
the Offences Against the Person Act, 9 Geo. IV, c. 31. When New South Wales officially
adopted English law in July 1828, the offense of petty treason was abolished there, too.
G.D. WOODS, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW IN NEW SOUTH WALES: THE COLONIAL PERIOD,
1788-1900 121-22 (2002).
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Defendant
Name
Crowley
Holden
Long Jack
(aboriginal)
Finnie
McGee
Glennie

CAROLYN B. RAMSEY

1838
1838

D’s
Sex
M
M

V’s
Charge
Sex
F
Murder
F
Murder

Acquitted
Guilty

1838

M

F

Murder

Guilty

1839
1839
1840

M
M
M

F
F
F

Murder
Murder
Murder

Guilty
Guilty
Manslaughter

Year

Verdict

[Vol. 100
Sentence
Death (commuted to
transportation for life)
Death (may have been
commuted)
Unclear
Executed
Transportation for life

